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AWAKENING THE PEOPLE’S GIANT: 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION’S REPUBLICAN COMMITMENT 
 
Fred O. Smith, Jr.*
 
 
This Article explores the relationship between two constitutional 
doctrines that have faced withering criticisms.  The first is the scant 
jurisprudence emanating from the Guarantee Clause, a provision that 
requires the United States to ensure republican forms of government in 
every state.  John Hart Ely and Richard Posner, among others, have 
observed that the Clause has been interpreted in ways that demote it to a 
dormant aspiration, hibernating in a dusty corner of the Constitution where 
courts dare not enter.  The second is sovereign immunity, which protects 
states from most federal lawsuits.  Scholars have labeled sovereign 
immunity’s application as unprincipled and “embarrassing,” primarily 
because this jurisprudence has purportedly outpaced the language of the 
Constitution. 
Taken seriously, however, the Guarantee Clause could reaffirm and 
reform the troubled doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Reaffirm, because the 
Clause has the ability to pillar important aspects of sovereign immunity 
with a more plausible textual basis than any currently cited by the Supreme 
Court.  The text and history of the Guarantee Clause illustrate that it 
protects representative democracy, a form of government that stands as one 
means of ensuring stability among the states.  Protecting representative 
government and ensuring states’ stability are among the very aims that 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law School; J.D., Stanford 
Law School; A.B., Harvard University.  I am grateful to Kathryn Abrams, Catherine 
Albiston, Michelle Wilde Anderson, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Robert Bartlett, Eric Biber, 
Jesse Choper, Dick Craswell, Tom Eaton, David Engstrom, Dick Fallon, Hon. William 
Fletcher, Mark Gergen, Amy Kapczynski, Pam Karlan, Stephen Lee, Gillian Lester, 
Goodwin Liu, Deborah Merritt, Melissa Murray, Bertrall Ross, Jeffrey Selbin, David 
Sklansky, Norm Spaulding, and Molly S. Van Houweling for their comments and 
suggestions.  Greg Miller and Judith Le provided invaluable research assistance.  I am 
especially indebted to the late Phil Frickey, whose influence on my legal thinking extends far 
beyond his generous and incisive commentary on this single work.  The title of this Article  
is taken from a statement made during the Reconstruction Era by Senator Charles Sumner of 
Massachusetts.  Referring to the Guarantee Clause, he said, “It is a clause which is like a 
sleeping giant in the Constitution, never until this recent war awakened, but now it comes 
forward with a giant’s power.” See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) 
(statement of Sen. Sumner); see also Jonathon K. Waldrop, Note, Rousing the Sleeping 
Giant? Federalism and the Guarantee Clause, 15 J.L. & POL. 267, 275 (1999). 
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animate sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  Reform, because the Clause 
also reflects a textual commitment to the principle of popular sovereignty.  
Therefore, any account of sovereign immunity must reconcile how the 
People and the States may both claim the mantle of sovereignty in our 
federal system.  The Court’s current approach to sovereign immunity fails 
to engage, let alone resolve, this quandary. 
I offer a detailed alternative approach to implementing sovereign 
immunity that is far more consonant with popular sovereignty and the 
principle of representative government.  This proposal would expand 
plaintiffs’ ability to challenge states for violations of constitutional 
violations bearing a substantial nexus with representative government.  It 
would also expand state legislatures’ ability to protect states from certain 
classes of statutory lawsuits through a new concept called “popular 
immunity.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
In America, as the story is written, the ultimate power rests with the 
people.  This was the aspiration of the Declaration of Independence, which 
proclaimed that legitimate government power emanates from the consent of 
the governed.  This was the design of constitutional architects such as 
Alexander Hamilton, who argued that the “fundamental principle of 
republican government . . . admits the right of the people to alter or abolish 
the established Constitution.”1  And this was the promise of the 
Constitution itself, which not only begins with the language “We the 
People,”2 but also establishes a textual commitment to republican forms of 
government in every state.3
Yet, when state actors violate federal laws enacted by the people, at least 
one remedy is frequently and conspicuously unavailable to the victims of 
lawless conduct:  the right to sue states directly.  For just as “the people 
themselves”
  The people are sovereign. 
4 are sovereign in America’s political system, the states 
similarly purport to be sovereigns, immune from federal lawsuits absent 
their consent.  To be sure, the words “sovereign immunity” appear nowhere 
in the Constitution, nor does the document speak directly to whether a 
citizen may sue her own state for violations of federal law.  Courts have 
instead concluded that such immunity emanates from “presupposition[s]”5
This Article is principally a tale, then, about the relationship between two 
constitutional provisions.  The first is a clause with lofty language but little 
in the way of legs.  The Guarantee Clause provides that “[t]he United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government.”
 
that the Eleventh Amendment affirms, as well as broader background 
principles of state sovereignty. 
6
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cynthia Brentley Johnson 
ed., 2004). 
  The words “shall” and “guarantee” bear strong 
 2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 5–19, 121 (2005) 
(analyzing the import of the words “We the People” in understanding the Constitution). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 4. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 5. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  In full, the Clause reads:  “The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect 
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connotations, linguistically and historically.7  More than a handful of 
litigants over the years have attempted to invoke this clause as a source of 
judicially enforced rights.  Yet, for roughly a century and a half, courts have 
incapacitated this option8 with few exceptions.9
The second is an amendment with textually modest meaning but mighty 
muscles.  The Eleventh Amendment reads:  “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
 
10  On its 
face, the text could be read to preclude federal courts from resolving suits 
against a state sounding in diversity jurisdiction.  Or, alternatively, the text 
might plausibly preclude any suit in which a citizen of one state or a citizen 
of a foreign government sues another state.  But the U.S. Supreme Court 
has ruled that the language stands as evidence of11 a wider and more 
tangled thicket of principles.12  No citizen13 or foreign government14
 
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” 
 may 
 7. Edward A. Stelzer, Bearing the Judicial Mantle:  State Court Enforcement of the 
Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 870 (1993) (observing “the vast, untapped 
potential of these words”). 
 8. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.17 (1980); Highland 
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Mountain Timber Co. v. 
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 
(1916); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256–
57 (1913); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 163–66 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 1, 42, 47 (1849). 
 9. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (“We need not resolve this 
difficult question today.  Even if we assume that petitioners’ claim is justiciable, neither the 
monetary incentives provided by the Act nor the possibility that a State’s waste producers 
may find themselves excluded from the disposal sites of another State can reasonably be said 
to deny any State a republican form of government.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 n.2 
(1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The statement[] . . . that this guaranty is enforceable only 
by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable.”); Attorney Gen. of Mich. ex rel. 
Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (finding that the creation of a school district by a 
state legislature does not violate the Guarantee Clause); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 
519 (1897) (holding that state courts rather than state legislature may determine municipal 
boundaries without violating the Guarantee Clause); In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461–62 
(1891) (finding that statutes were validly enacted by a republican government); Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175–77 (1874) (holding that the Guarantee Clause did not provide 
women with the right to vote); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 563–64 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that racial segregation is “inconsistent with the guarantee 
given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government”). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 11. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 728 (1999) (stating that while the phrase 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity” abounds in caselaw, it is “convenient shorthand but 
something of a misnomer” because state sovereign immunity “derives not from the Eleventh 
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself”). 
 12. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 446 (2002) (“Although most sovereign 
immunity questions have tolerably clear answers, they often lie at the end of a maze of 
precedents that only a specialist could navigate with confidence.” (citing David L. Shapiro, 
The 1999 Trilogy:  What Is Good Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 758 (2000) (“[T]he 
total picture is a Byzantine aggregation of rules and doctrines.”))). 
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sue a state in federal15 or state court16 absent either express congressional 
authority or state waiver.17  And even when Congress expressly purports to 
abrogate state immunity, this legislative action “must exhibit ‘congruence 
and proportionality’” to the constitutional violations Congress is attempting 
to remedy.18  Further, Congress may only abrogate states’ sovereign 
immunity if the legislation is authorized by either the Enforcement Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment19 or the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, 
Section 8.20
The Supreme Court has located these rules in the Eleventh Amendment, 
or at least the “Eleventeenth Amendment”
 
21 and the background principle 
of sovereign immunity that amendment evidences.  As Justice Antonin 
Scalia, an architect of this expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment, 
has famously put it, the Court understands the provision “to stand not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional 
structure which it confirms:  that the States entered the federal system with 
their sovereignty intact.”22
This Article argues that if the Eleventh Amendment confirms a 
background “presupposition” of state sovereignty, the Guarantee Clause 
may enrich the debate about the nature of that presupposition, especially 
with respect to suits premised on federal question jurisdiction.  Because the 
Guarantee Clause reinforces the principles of popular sovereignty and 
representative government, the Clause must be a critical part of any 
comprehensive textual or historical account about the scope of state 
sovereign immunity. 
 
Others have proposed a wide range of potential interpretations of the 
Guarantee Clause, especially over the past three decades or so.  As Akhil 
Reed Amar has put it, the Clause, “[l]ike the apostle Paul, . . . has been 
 
 13. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890). 
 14. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
 15. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. 
 16. Alden, 527 U.S. at 759.  The case prohibited a group of Maine probation officers 
from suing their employer, the state of Maine, in state court for refusing to pay them 
overtime in violation of their federal statutory rights. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 374 n.9 (2001) 
(quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 19. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 20. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378–79 (2006); see also id. at 379–93 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 21. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
183, 188–93 (noting that following Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), “a court 
that used to see the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on the Eleventh has come to see 
the Eleventh as a constraint on the Fourteenth”). 
 22. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); see also Welch v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) (“[T]he Court long ago 
held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen’s own 
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment refer only to suits by 
citizens of another State.”). 
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‘made all things to all men.’”23  Scholars and political figures have argued 
that the Guarantee Clause is a shield against states violating the Bill of 
Rights;24 that the Clause should anchor voting rights decisions;25 that the 
Clause protects the right to bear arms;26 and, with increasing frequency, 
that the Clause bans or limits forms of direct democracy.27  The wide and 
divergent interpretations that scholars have given to the Clause stand as 
accidental monuments to John Adams’s acknowledgment in an 1807 letter 
that he “never understood” what the Guarantee Clause meant and his 
simultaneous prediction that “no man . . . ever will.”28
Still, invoking the Guarantee Clause to inform sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence has escaped academic discussion.  This is surprising for at 
least three reasons.  First, the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence has been besieged by well-known, well-argued criticisms.  
Commentators and jurists have convincingly labeled the Eleventh 
 
 
 23. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:  Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 
(1994) (quoting 1 Corinthians 9:22 (King James)). 
 24. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4:  A 
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 568–69 (1962); see also Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1242 
(1992) (discussing Sen. James Nye and Rep. Roswell Hart—two proponents of this 
expansive idea during the 39th Congress of 1866). 
 25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 118 n.* (1980). 
 26. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1629 (1866) (statement of Rep. Roswell Hart) 
(cited in McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3102 n.25 (2010)). 
 27. See, e.g., Charles R. Brock, Republican Form of Government Imperiled, 7 A.B.A. J. 
133 passim (1921); Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers:  Representative 
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 421, 427 (1998); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican 
Government”:  The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 passim (1993); 
Glenway Maxon, Is the Referendum Anti-republican?, 72 CENT. L.J. 378 passim (1911); 
Anya J. Stein, Note, The Guarantee Clause in the States:  Structural Protections for 
Minority Rights and Necessary Limits on the Initiative Power, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
343, 345, 362–67, 370 (2010); see also Kristin Feeley, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected 
President, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1427, 1438 n.60 (2009) (“[D]irect democracy at the state 
level may or may not violate the guarantee of republican state government, but direct 
democracy at the national level, such as a national referendum, almost certainly violates the 
Guarantee Clause.”). But see Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not A Democracy? Initiative, 
Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 814 (2002) 
(“[T]here is a clear historical answer to the question of whether legislative plebiscites violate 
the Guarantee Clause.  That answer is ‘no.’”). Cf. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. 
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (“It is inherent in a republican form of government that 
direct public participation in government policymaking is limited.”); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150–51 (1912) (finding that the question whether citizen-
lawmaking violates the Guarantee Clause constitutes a non-justiciable political question); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-democratic?, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 
622–35 (1998). 
 28. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 72 
(1972) (quoting Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807)).  President 
Adams added that the “The word [republic] is so loose and indefinite that successive 
predominant factions will put glosses and constructions upon it as different as light and 
darkness.” Id. 
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Amendment doctrine atextual,29 ahistorical,30 divorced from basic 
constitutional purposes,31 unconstitutional,32 and just plain embarrassing.33
Second, courts have tranquilized the Guarantee Clause, concluding that 
all causes of action under that amendment are non-justiciable political 
questions.
  
With so many analytic arrows puncturing a wounded Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, one might think that the Guarantee Clause, a provision born 
in part to protect the principles of popular sovereignty, might be awakened 
and enlisted in the front lines of this conversation.  It has not.  This Article 
seeks to fill that gap. 
34  Notable scholars have criticized this outcome.35
 
 29. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1825 (2010) (“The leading theories of the Eleventh Amendment go 
beyond the words of the Amendment without a fully convincing theoretical basis.”); John F. 
Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663, 1666, 1750 (2004) (“[I]t is a familiar reality that almost none of the Court’s 
important cases involving the Amendment deal with matters that fall within its 
terms. . . .  [T]he Court . . . must not readjust the Amendment’s precise terms to capture their 
apparent background purpose.”); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); James E. Pfander, History and State Stability:  
An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1323–52 
(1998) (contending that the amendment was an “explanatory amendment,” designed to shield 
states from liability for debts accrued under the Articles of Confederation); see also John J. 
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:  A Reinterpretation, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 (1983) (“Neither federal question cases nor admiralty cases fit 
within [the Amendment’s] language, within the intention of its framers, or within the 
interpretation that the Court consistently gave it prior to the constitutional crisis of 1877.”). 
  It is highly 
unusual for an entire clause of the Constitution to be interpreted in a manner 
that, in effect, demotes it superfluity.  On the scale of constitutional 
dormancy, the Clause is only rivaled, perhaps, by the Fourteenth 
 30. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines:  Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 
1279–80 (1978) (arguing that sovereign immunity is not constitutionally compelled and, 
therefore, can be abrogated by Congress); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment:  A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction 
Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033–34 (1983) 
(“The Court apparently views the amendment as a form of jurisdictional bar that specifically 
limits the power of federal courts to hear private citizens’ suits against unconsenting states.  
This article contends that as a historical matter this view of the amendment is mistaken.”). 
 31. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1204–06 
(2001) (arguing that a basic constitutional premise—that a remedy exist for a right—is 
undermined by continuing the outdated principle of sovereign immunity). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Michael E. Solimine, Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of 
the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (2003) (book review). 
 34. See supra notes 8–9, 12. 
 35. Dean John Hart Ely called Guarantee Clause jurisprudence an “unfortunate doctrine” 
that extended a proper holding in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) to contexts in 
which political question considerations were less relevant. See ELY, supra note 25, at 118 
n.*; see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (stating that 
“this result has been powerfully criticized,” but that “it is too well entrenched to be 
overturned at our level of the judiciary” (citing ELY, supra note 25, at 118 n.*)). 
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Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.36  But even that clause has 
been interpreted to mean something.37
Third, scholars such as Amar and Deborah Jones Merritt have argued that 
the Clause protects sovereignty, though they invoke the term “sovereignty” 
in distinct ways that are in tension with one another.  Amar argues that the 
Guarantee Clause is a basis for popular sovereignty and its attendant 
principles.
 
38  And Merritt argues that the Clause should be understood as a 
basis for state sovereignty defined as “autonomy” from undue intervention 
by the federal government.39
While neither argument directly addresses the Clause’s implications for 
sovereign immunity, both of their visions, to varying degrees, are 
nonetheless reconcilable with my own argument.  To the extent that 
damages lawsuits have the power to threaten a state’s stability or existence 
 
 
 36. The Fourteenth Amendment reads:  “No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV.  Scholars have noted that seminal cases decided in the late 1800s threw water 
on any heat initially radiating from this clause. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36 (1873).  Indeed, as one commentator put it, “From the perspective of modern 
American constitutional law, the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth 
amendment belongs in a museum, in the dinosaur section.” Dr. Patricia Allan Lucie, White 
Rights as a Model for Black:  Or—Who’s Afraid of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?, 38 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 859, 859 (1987); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 37, 166 (1990) (concluding that the Supreme Court 
rendered the clause “a dead letter”); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1675 (Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello & Kenneth R. 
Thomas eds., 2002) (stating that nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedents relegated the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause superfluous); Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great 
Justice?:  Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870–1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 78 
(1950) (stating that the Slaughter-House Cases “virtually scratched” the clause from the 
Constitution). But see Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New 
York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 465 (2005) (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause is a more 
logical source for the protection of the right to contract than the Due Process Clause.”); see 
also Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351, 383 (1997) (comparing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause with the Guarantee Clause). 
 37. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–01 (1999) (recognizing the right to travel).  The 
Supreme Court recently considered the question of whether the Second Amendment is 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).  The Court 
concluded that the Due Process Clause is the source of this incorporation. See generally id. 
 38. See Amar, supra note 23, at 749.  Amar explains that popular sovereignty includes 
“the people’s right to alter or abolish, and popular majority rule in making and changing 
constitutions.”  He explains, however, that his exposition of the principles animating 
“Republican Government” is not intended to be exhaustive, as “many particular ideas can 
comfortably nestle under its big tent.” Id. 
 39. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1988).  Building on her thesis, Michael B. 
Rappaport briefly considered the possibility that the Guarantee Clause could serve as a basis 
for sovereign immunities in a footnote of Reconciling Textualism and Federalism:  The 
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 819, 830 n.41 (1999) (“It might be argued that state immunities could be 
derived from the Guarantee Clause.”).  He nevertheless rejected this possibility, concluding 
that “the clause, however, cannot be the source of these immunities [because, among other 
reasons, the] language and structure of the clause indicate that it was addressed primarily to 
anti-republican actions taken on the state level rather than by the federal government.” Id. 
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by undermining fundamental premises of representative government, the 
Guarantee Clause is the Constitution’s most textually and historically sound 
guard against these threats.  But the Guarantee Clause also stands for the 
principle that the ultimate sovereign is the people, and therefore the people 
alone have the final say over when a state may inoculate itself with the 
immunities of sovereignty. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I presents the textual and historical 
support for the view that the Guarantee Clause informs the background 
principle of state sovereign immunity in classes of cases not outlined in the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The part opens with the text, examining the 
structure and words of the Clause, as well as the language of various draft 
versions that preceded it.  This part also explores broader historical 
documents such as the Federalist Papers, constitutional ratification debates, 
and materials that proponents of the Constitution distributed to assure those 
who feared that the document’s passage would critically weaken states.  
Collectively, this evidence reveals that the Clause, like others in Article IV, 
was motivated by a desire to protect what I call “state integrity.”  In 
particular, as a definitional matter, the Clause was intended to protect 
states’ stability, parity, and existence, values that also have traditionally 
motivated sovereign immunity for states. 
Through the Clause, the Founders sought to protect these tenets of state 
integrity through what they called “the republican principle.”40
Part II provides an overview of the relevant sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence before testing the Guarantee Clause’s key principles against 
three legal moments—two historical realities and one futurist hypothetical.  
These collective lessons counsel against eradicating sovereign immunity 
altogether, but nonetheless suggest that there is a gap between republican 
values and existing practice with respect to the content and contours of 
sovereign immunity in cases predicated on federal question jurisdiction. 
  The 
“republican principle” is the cardinal and indispensible axiom that the 
ultimate sovereignty in our constitutionally recognized polities rests in the 
hands of the governed, not persons who happen to govern.  The Founders 
sought to actualize this principle through a specific form of government:  
representative democracy.  They believed that this form defended the 
people against the polar forces of despotism and anarchy, forces that could 
strengthen or weaken a state to such a point that the union itself faced peril. 
Building on these lessons, Part III examines the doctrinal consequences 
of my reading of the Guarantee Clause.  I argue that the Clause invites two 
departures from the current manner in which state sovereign immunity is 
enforced with respect to cases grounded in federal law.  First, when 
Congress expressly abrogates states’ sovereign immunity, any violating 
state should face suit under that enacted statutory provision unless, by 
legislation, that state expressly opts out of that damages provision.  Second, 
states should be subjected to damages liability for violations of 
 
 40. James Madison, The Virginia Plan, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 36 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). 
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constitutional provisions that bear a substantial nexus with free and equal 
representative government. 
Part IV explores why rousing the Guarantee Clause would protect 
sovereign immunity from a number of the criticisms currently launched at 
that doctrine.  The Clause protects the background principle of sovereign 
immunity from the criticism that the doctrine has outpaced the text of the 
Constitution.  Simultaneously, taking the Clause seriously urges that it must 
not serve as an impenetrable barrier to suits in which state citizens sue 
states for violations of federal laws enacted by the people. 
I.  “A SLEEPING GIANT”41
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence. 
 
United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 442
[T]o assure us of the intention of the framers of this constitution to 
preserve the individual sovereignty and independence of the States 
inviolate, we find it expressly declared by the 4th section of the 4th 
article, that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union, 
a republican form of government.” 
 
Jasper Yeates, Pennsylvania Ratification Delegate, 178743
To understand the implications of the Guarantee Clause for state 
sovereignty, this Article invokes a form of constitutional interpretation 
rooted in the original meaning of the Constitution’s language.  In particular, 
I use a method popularized by Jack Balkin called “text and principle.”
 
44
 
 41. See CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner); 
Waldrop, supra note *, at 275. 
  
This approach involves two steps.  First, it requires a careful study of the 
Constitution’s precise text, with a focus on the original meaning of those 
words.  Second, if the Constitution invokes a broad principle (like 
republicanism), interpreters investigate the reasons the adopters chose 
specific language, and exercise fidelity to the key concepts embodied in the 
constitutional text.  The goal is not necessarily to discover how the 
Founders predicted that courts would apply necessarily capacious words to 
specific circumstances.  Instead, the goal is to excavate and apply the 
principles the words command.  To that end, this part marshals founding 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 43. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 297 (John Bach 
McMaster & Frederick Dawson Stone eds., 1888). 
 44. See Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 
11, 11 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); see also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and 
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007). Cf. Fred O. Smith, Jr., 
Crawford’s Aftershock:  Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History 
and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1521–23 (2008) 
(identifying the original principles animating the Confrontation Clause, and exploring ways 
the doctrine could be more faithful to those principles). 
2012] AWAKENING THE PEOPLE’S “GIANT” 1951 
documents to discern the key concepts that motivated the language of the 
Guarantee Clause.  Part II then tests whether these concepts are compatible 
with sovereign immunity in cases predicated on federal question 
jurisdiction. 
The weight of historical evidence suggests that the Clause was 
conceived, at least in significant part, to protect the principle of “state 
integrity.”  By state integrity, I intend to capture a different and broader 
concept than Professor Merritt’s “state autonomy” principle.45  She argues 
that the Clause “suggest[s] a limit on the power of the federal government 
to infringe state autonomy:  the citizens of a state cannot operate a 
republican government, ‘choos[ing] their own officials’ and ‘enact[ing] 
their own laws,’ if their government is beholden to Washington.”46
As described below, these three prongs of state integrity were viewed as 
overlapping and symbiotic, rather than distinct concepts.  A threat to a 
state’s stability or existence is, by definition, a threat to that state’s parity 
with its sister states.  On the other hand, the strength that an enterprising 
state could gain by taking advantage of a destabilized state could, likewise, 
imperil state parity. 
  I argue 
that the Framers and the people were not only concerned about excessive 
intervention by the Federal government; they were at least as concerned 
with a broader range of threats to the states’ existence, stability, and 
parity—threats to state integrity that loomed without and within. 
Among the means the Framers conscripted to protect state integrity were 
readily intuitive ones, including protecting states from invasions and 
insurrections.47  Yet, in the same article and section of the Constitution that 
guards against those two threats, the Framers also invoked a third, less 
intuitive method to protect states from becoming significantly weaker or 
stronger than their neighbors, “the republican principle.”48  This principle 
affirmatively guaranteed that the ultimate power in state governments rested 
in the hands of the people.  As James Madison explained, “the republican 
principle” defended against “the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of 
government everywhere.”49  And as Alexander Hamilton explained, among 
the virtues of a republic is that this “form of . . . society” helped reduce and 
prevent “internal corruptions” and “all manner of inconveniences.”50  
Under such a system, the people have the power to change representatives 
and laws, including in the event of “ill-administration.”51
 
 45. Merritt, supra note 
  It was accepted 
39, at 25; see also Amar, supra note 23, at 754 (explaining that 
under the “State Autonomy Thesis . . . a core meaning of the Article IV Republican 
Government Clause is that the federal government is limited in its ability to restructure state 
government at will”). 
 46. Merritt, supra note 39, at 25. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 48. Madison, supra note 40, at 36. 
 49. Id. 
 50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 1, at 56 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 1, at 141 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The natural 
cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative constitution, is a change of 
men.”). 
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“that frequent elections of the representatives of the people, are the 
sovereign remedy of all grievances in a free government.”52
A.  Text 
 
Two text-based interpretive approaches help elucidate the original 
meaning of the Guarantee Clause.53  The first is the legal maxim that a 
word is known by its associates.54  The second is a more cardinal principle:  
words and phrases reflect what those who adopted the Constitution most 
naturally would have understood them to mean.55
1.  The Company the Clause Keeps 
 
Each clause in Section 4 of Article IV is aimed at protecting states’ 
existence, stability, and parity.56
 
 52. FABIUS, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:  WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 
1787–1788, at 62 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
  The two clauses accompanying the 
 53. See generally HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK:  COLD STEEL WARRIOR 119 (1996) 
(describing Justice Black’s textual approach to constitutional interpretation).  Even 
proponents of different forms of purposivism believe that interpretations should bear a 
significant relationship to the text. See ELY, supra note 25, at 118 n.* (explaining that “in 
textual terms” the right to vote “is most naturally assignable to the Republican Form 
Clause”); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH 
WITH THE CONSTITUTION 37 (2010) (“[C]onstitutional meaning is a function of both text and 
context.”); John Hart Ely, Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 949 (1973) (“A neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy 
forever.  But if it lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not 
a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.”). 
 54. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1160–61 (9th ed. 2009) (defining noscitur a sociis as a 
“canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be 
determined by the words immediately surrounding it”); see, e.g., Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. 
88, 104–05 (1834) (invoking this principle to define the ex post facto clause in the 
constitution).  Ogden v. Saunders is another early case that illustrates both the long-standing 
precedential validity and practical usefulness of this approach to constitutional interpretation. 
25 U.S. 213, 217 (1827). Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 
(1999) (arguing that when the same word or phrase recurs in the Constitution, a presumption 
should arise that those usages should receive similar constitutional definitions). But see 
Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar:  The Trouble with 
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 731 (2000) (rejecting a “strong” version of Amar’s 
argument that reoccurrences of the same word should generally be construed identically, but 
accepted a “weak” version of the argument sensitive to other traditional tools of 
constitutional interpretation such as history and precedent); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 168 (2008) (clarifying 
that intratextual analysis “must be used with caution and close attention to context”). 
  My use of the clauses surrounding the Guarantee Clause falls outside the perimeter 
of this debate for two reasons.  First, my argument does not depend at all on interpreting 
recurring words similarly or identically.  Second, to the extent my argument may be termed 
“intratextual,” it is a “weak” form, sensitive to the context and proximity of a set of 
constitutional clauses and their shared history. 
 55. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal 
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” (quoting United States v. Sprague, 
282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824); 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325–26 (1816). 
 56. Cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512 (2009) 
(“[A] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that 
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Guarantee Clause in that section protect each state “against Invasion” and 
“against domestic Violence.”57  In Federalist No. 43, Madison concluded 
that the Invasion Clause provided security to “each state . . . against foreign 
hostility, [and] . . . ambitious or vindictive enterprizes of its more powerful 
neighbours.”58  Likewise, the Domestic Violence Clause was aimed at 
squelching insurrections by those who wished “to subvert a government.”59  
Madison predicted that such moments would be rare,60 but that when they 
occurred, the insurrection should be “repressed by the Superintending 
power.”61
Both clauses, then, protected states from events that threatened their 
existence, stability, and, concomitantly, parity with other states.  But the 
promise of protection against insurrections came with the contemporaneous 
assurance that such protection would only come when a state expressly 
asked for it, either through an “Application of the Legislature,” or the 
state’s executive if the legislature could not convene.
 
62  Thus, the Invasion 
Clause carried with it the not-so-subtle understanding that the unchecked 
and unsolicited intervention by the federal government could be a source of, 
rather merely than a shield against, the very harm that clause sought to 
prevent:  “tearing a State to pieces.”63
Importantly, the Drafters feared that a calamitously ruptured state not 
only threatened that infirm state.  It also threatened the existence of the 
union itself.  In defending Section 4, Madison cited Montesquieu’s 
observation, offered in Spirit of Laws, “‘that should a popular insurrection 
happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it.  Should abuses 
creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound.’”
 
64  
Otherwise, the probability would escalate that an insurrection could have 
“pervad[ed] all the States,” a “calamity[] for which no possible constitution 
can provide a cure.”65
The remaining sections in Article IV surrounding Section 4 similarly 
protect states’ integrity, largely by protecting their equality relative to each 
other.  Article IV, Section 1 contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
requiring the mutual recognition of states’ public records, acts, and 
 
 
a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets.”). 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 312 (James Madison); see also Debate 
From the Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1299, 1311–12 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
1993).  Some courts have cited Federalist No. 43 for the proposition that to qualify as an 
invasion, the invader must be a government or similar political entity. See, e.g., California v. 
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 1997); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28 
(2d Cir. 1996). 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 312 (James Madison). 
 60. Id. at 312–13 (noting that “federal interposition” would occur in the rare instance 
that the insurgent faction bore “some proportion to the friends of government”). 
 61. Id. at 313. 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 313 (James Madison). 
 64. Id. at 314 (citing MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748)). 
 65. Id. (citing MONTESQUIEU, supra note 64). 
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judgments.66  Section 2, sometimes referred to as the Comity Clause,67 
guarantees that the citizens of each state will receive the privileges and 
immunities of the “citizens in the several states,” thereby protecting 
individuals from discrimination based on their state citizenship.68  
Section 369 further protects states’ integrity by ensuring that no newly 
created state can be “formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other 
State.”70  Nor can any two states be joined together without those states’—
and the federal government’s—consent.71
Thus, not only is every clause in Section 4 of Article IV aimed at 
protecting state’s existence, stability, and parity—every section in Article 
IV is as well. 
 
2.  “Republican Form”:  Popular Sovereignty 
and Representative Government 
There is broad consensus that as a textual matter, “republican” refers at a 
minimum to popular sovereignty and the principle of majority rule.72
 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See generally 142 CONG. REC. S5932, 13360–61 (daily ed. 
June 16, 1996) (Letter from Laurence H. Tribe regarding the Defense of Marriage Act) 
(stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause embodies “one of the Constitution’s core 
guarantees that the United States of America will remain a union of equal sovereigns”). 
  
 67. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 327 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“The 
Comity Clause guarantees that the ‘Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2)); 
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 889 (1986). 
 68. The clause has long been understood to mean that states cannot discriminate on the 
basis of an American citizen’s state citizenship. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 549 
(C.C.E.D. Pa.) (1823).  James Madison, in Federalist No. 42, described a similar provision 
in the Articles of Confederation:  “[T]hose who come under the denomination of free 
inhabitants of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled in every other State to 
all the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be 
entitled to in their own State.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 1, at 304 (James 
Madison).  For a general discussion of the clause, see David S. Bogen, The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794 (1987).  For a challenge to the 
traditional view of the clause, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1192 (2009) (“As originally 
understood, the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not protect a right to travel, or any 
other natural right.”). 
 69. In a memorialization of officially sanctioned terrorism, Section 3 provides that 
escaped slaves were required to be returned to the state in which they were owned. Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 537 (1856) (Grier, J., concurring) (“In the formation of the Federal 
Constitution, care was taken to confer no power on the Federal Government to interfere with 
this institution in the States.”); cf. Ronald Hamowy, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBERTARIANISM 
127 (2008) (referencing William Lloyd Garrison’s views that the pro-slavery Constitution 
amounts to a “pact with the devil”). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Charlton C. Copeland, Ex Parte Young:  Sovereignty, Immunity, and the 
Constitutional Structure of American Federalism, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 843, 865 (2009) 
(“[T]he Guarantee Clause also stands for the position that recognizing states as political 
communities is inextricably connected to their being controlled by a sovereign People.”); 
Daniel S. Korobkin, Republicanism on the Outside:  A New Reading of the Reconstruction 
Congress, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 487, 491 (2008) (“One conventional view of 
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Indeed, the word “republican” derives from the Latin word “respublica;” 
res means “affair” and publicus means “public.”73  As James Madison 
noted, at its core, the word “republican” describes a government that 
“derives all its powers . . . from the great body of the people.”74  Similarly, 
an eighteenth century dictionary defined “Republican” as “Placing the 
government in the people.”75  Professor Amar has demonstrated that the 
historical record is replete with similar definitions of the word at the 
Founding,76
[T]he subtle invocation of the people in the Republican Government 
Clause of Article IV reaffirms basic principles of popular sovereignty—of 
the right of the people to ordain and establish government, of their right to 
alter or abolish it, and of the centrality of popular majority rule, in these 
exercises of ultimate popular sovereignty.
 leading to one increasingly accepted conclusion: 
77
The more debatable point is whether “republican form” also refers to a 
system of representative government.
 
78
 
republicanism is simply government by the people, or popular sovereignty.  In developing 
this theory of republicanism, Professor Amar suggests that true republicanism is properly 
understood as pro-democratic rather than anti-democratic.” (citing Amar, supra note 
  However, the weight of the 
evidence suggests that the phrase “republican form” was understood to 
protect representative government.  For example, Justice Joseph Story’s 
early-nineteenth-century constitutional Commentaries defined a republican 
government as one in which “all its powers were derived directly or 
indirectly from the people, and were administered by functionaries holding 
23, at 
756–59)); William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism and the Guarantee Clause, 2 
GREEN BAG 2d 269, 271 (1999) (stating that the Guarantee Clause prohibits “choices and 
experiments” that fall outside “the zone of popular sovereignty”); Note, The Case for 
Compulsory Voting in the United States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591, 606 (2007) (“[T]here is 
some consensus that the clause guarantees majoritarian democratic government.”); see also 
Jacob Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Guarantee Clause Regulation of State 
Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2010) (“In short, republican governments rule 
(1) by the majority (and not a monarch), (2) through elected representatives, (3) in separate, 
coequal branches.”). 
 73. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 673 (2d ed. 1989). 
 74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (emphasis added) (cited in Amar, supra 
note 23, at 765). 
 75. Amar, supra note 23, at 764; Merritt, supra note 39, at 24 n.130. 
 76. Amar, supra note 23, at 761–73. 
 77. Id. at 762. 
 78. Amar has thoughtfully contended that “republican” was understood to protect 
majority rule, but not necessarily in the form of elected representatives. See Amar, supra 
note 23, at 756 n.27.  He notes that most arguments as to whether republicanism was 
intended to protect representative government rely almost exclusively on Federalist No. 10, 
which I refer to in greater detail above in the text. Id. at 756.  He contends that a close 
reading of that essay illustrates that Madison was expressing his own views; he was not 
purporting to capture or provide the commonly understood definition of the day. Id. at 757.  
In reaching the conclusion that I do, I rely on more than Federalist No. 10—including the 
text of the Constitution, dictionaries, treatises, other Federalist Papers, and the broader 
purpose behind the Guarantee Clause. See also Natelson, supra note 27, at 815 (“The 
Guarantee Clause probably does not require a state to have any representative legislature at 
all.”). 
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their offices during pleasure, or for a limited period, or during good 
behavior.”79
Likewise, in James Madison’s canonical essay on the danger of factions, 
he distinguished between what he considered to be a “pure Democracy” and 
a “Republic.”
 
80  He wrote:  “A Republic, by which I mean a Government in 
which the scheme of representation takes place . . . promises the cure for 
which we are seeking.”81
The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a Republic 
are, first, the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest:  secondly, the greater number of 
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be 
extended.
  He continued: 
82
He expounded this view in Federalist No. 37: 
 
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only 
that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted 
with it should be kept . . . by a short duration of their appointments; and 
that even during this short period, the trust should be placed not in a few, 
but in a number of hands.83
Madison’s view that republicanism referred in part to representative 
government was by no means anachronistic.  During the Virginia 
ratification debates, Patrick Henry stated, “The delegation of power to an 
adequate number of representatives, and an unimpeded reversion of it back 
to the people, at short periods, form the principal traits of a republican 
government.”
 
84  Even today, the Oxford English Dictionary defines a 
republic as “[a] state in which the supreme power rests in the people and 
their elected representatives or officers, as opposed to one governed by a 
king or similar ruler; a commonwealth.”85
The constitutional language surrounding “republican form” adds 
credence to the view that the phrase was understood to capture popular 
sovereignty and representative government within its ambit.  For one, 
Article IV’s words reflect an unqualified assumption that each state would 
have a legislature.  Article IV, Section 3 commands that no state shall be 
formed within the boundaries of another state unless Congress and both 
states’ legislatures approve.  And the very section in which the Guarantee 
Clause is found, Article IV, Section 4, permits Congress to protect states 
from invasion if a state legislature requests. 
 
It is relevant that every state had a legislature and a system of 
representative government at the time the Constitution was drafted and 
 
 79. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 293 (5th ed. 1994). 
 80. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 65–66 (James Madison). 
 81. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
 83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 253 (James Madison). 
 84. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 396 (J. Elliot ed. 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT DEBATES]. 
 85. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 73, at 673. 
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ratified.  It was widely understood that the state governments in place at the 
founding were, in fact, republican.  James Madison explained in Federalist 
No. 43 that the new American system was “founded on republican 
principles, and composed of republican members.”86  Further, as Justice 
Story explained in Commentaries, and as was reiterated in Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary decades later, for a “form of government . . . to be guaranteed,” 
one must “suppose[] a form already established, and this is the republican 
form of government the United States have undertaken to protect.”87  
Madison confirmed this in equally lucid terms in Federalist No. 37.88  In a 
governmental system comprised of intimately connected political 
institutions, a union has a “right to insist that the forms of government 
under which the compact was entered into, should be substantially 
maintained.”89
The goals of the Guarantee Clause counter any remaining doubt that the 
founders sought to include both “popular sovereignty” and “representative 
government” under the umbrella “republican form.”  As described in 
greater detail below, the Founders sought to protect state stability, in order 
to ensure that no state became too strong (bending toward despotism) or too 
weak (bending toward anarchy).
  Thus, substantial deviations from the forms of 
representative government found in states at the founding would prompt 
vexing if not insurmountable questions about whether the new forms were 
republican. 
90  Irregular or easily malleable legislation, 
according to Madison, was “odious to the people.”91
B.  History 
  To the extent the 
Clause was expected to reduce the prospect of chaotic anarchy, it is difficult 
to conceive how guaranteeing majority rule, without guaranteeing a “form” 
to actualize majority rule, could produce this stability.  Representative 
government provided the well-tested and contained form for the ultimate 
sovereign, the people, to express its will. 
1.  The Drafters 
The drafting history of the Guarantee Clause further reflects the 
Founders’ view that republicanism would serve to protect state integrity.  
The Clause was conceived in May 1787, when Governor Edmond Randolph 
 
 86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 310 (James Madison). 
 87. BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 465 (1868); Copeland, supra note 72, at 865 (“[T]he 
Guarantee Clause stands for the Constitution’s recognition that state governments are 
political communities, whose existence predates the Constitution’s ratification.”); see also 2 
STORY, supra note 79, § 1807. 
 88. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 310–11 (James Madison). 
 90. Shay’s Rebellion, effectuated under the Articles of Confederation, escalated the fear 
of anarchy. See WIECEK, supra note 28, at 48.  King George III’s rule likely fueled the fear 
of despotism. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).  Dean Larry 
Kramer has identified evidence that some Anti-Federalists were also concerned that 
Federalists had monarchial aims. See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 130. 
 91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 253 (James Madison). 
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of Virginia introduced a resolution at the Constitutional Convention “that a 
Republican Government & the territory of each State, except in the instance 
of a voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought to be guaranteed 
by the United States to each State.”92  Over the course of the next several 
months, as amendments to the resolution were considered and enacted, the 
Clause morphed into its current form.  James Madison, one of the more 
active members of the amendment process, proposed substituting “that the 
constitutional authority of the States shall be guaranteed to them 
respectively [against] domestic as well as foreign violence.”93
At the outset, however, at least one historical characteristic about the 
Clause’s original form is noteworthy.  The Clause closely resembles the 
language of a 1781 Virginia statute that ceded territory to the Confederation 
Congress:  “[T]hat the States so formed shall be distinct Republican States 
and be admitted Members of the Federal Union having the same Rights of 
Sovereignty Freedom and Independence as the other States.”
 
94  In light of 
the fact that Randolph was not only a Virginia delegate,95 but also the 
Governor of Virginia,96
During the convention and beyond, Randolph and Madison both 
illuminated the Clause’s intent.  Their words suggest that the Clause was 
intended to ensure that no state government became too destabilized or 
weak, and that no government became too strong.  Either extreme 
threatened the remaining states and, therefore, the Union.  At the 
convention, Randolph explained that the resolution was both to “secure” 
republican government and stop “domestic commotions.”
 it is likely that the Clause is a self-conscious 
descendent of an earlier territory-based statute that expressly linked 
republicanism and sovereignty. 
97  Just as 
important, he explained that warding off forms of commotion that could 
undermine a state’s existence and protecting republican government were 
related, rather than distinct, concepts:  the republican principle would help 
reduce “the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government 
everywhere.”98
Madison’s greater concern was that absent a guarantee of a republican 
form of government, a state government would become rapacious, 
devouring its neighbors.
 
99
 
 92. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
  He expressed concerns about monarchies and 
other unforeseeable “experiments” induced by “the ambition of enterprizing 
 93. 2 id. at 47–48. 
 94. WIECEK, supra note 28, at 16 (quoting 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 352 
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
 95. 2 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787:  A COMPREHENSIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 641 (2005); see also Madison, supra note 40, at 
37–39. 
 96. VILE, supra note 95, at 641. 
 97. 2 FARRAND, supra note 92, at 47. 
 98. Madison, supra note 40, at 36. 
 99. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
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leaders.”100  He intimated that “ambitious or vindictive enterprizes” by 
powerful states could threaten the existence and stability of other states, by 
rendering “the weaker members of the Union” even weaker.101
2.  Ratification Debates:  Within and Without Chamber Halls 
 
During ratification debates, leaders invoked the Clause and the 
Constitution’s commitment to republicanism to ease anxiety that the new 
constitution would “annihilate[]”102 or dissolve103 states generally, and 
undermine their sovereignty in particular.104  The most extensive exchanges 
with respect to the Clause during the ratification debates occurred in 
Pennsylvania.  Lawyer James Wilson, who voted in favor of the 
Constitution105 and would later serve on the Supreme Court,106 catalogued 
some of the concerns others had expressed with respect to sovereignty.  He 
noted others’ apprehension that “[i]n this confederated republic, the 
sovereignty of states, it is said, is not preserved.”107  He remarked that some 
of the delegates had expressed concerns that if states were sued in federal 
court, they would need to “be engaged in a controversy” and “acknowledge 
the jurisdiction of that court.”108  That was not “the custom of 
sovereigns,”109 a point made by delegates at ratification debates 
elsewhere.110
Wilson and delegate Jasper Yeates answered these charges in a number 
of ways.  Wilson focused largely on the relationship between popular 
sovereignty and state sovereignty.  He argued that supreme sovereignty 
actually rested with the people.
 
111  The people could delegate or surrender 
that sovereignty to a government if they wished.112
 
 100. Id. at 311; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, supra note 
  And while he did not 
explicitly cite the Guarantee Clause in support of his popular sovereignty 
argument, it has been posited that he intended to mention the clause, since 
1, at 141–42 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“A guarantee by the national authority would be as much levelled against the 
usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the 
community.”). 
 101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 312 (James Madison). 
 102. Tench Coxe, A Freeman, Essays:  I–III, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 30 & Feb. 
6, 1788, as reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:  WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” 
FEDERALISTS, supra note 52, at 89 [hereinafter Coxe Essays]. 
 103. Merritt, supra note 39, at 32 (General Brooks sought to allay fears that the 
“‘Constitution would produce a dissolution of the state governments.’” (quoting 2 ELLIOT 
DEBATES, supra note 84, at 99–100)). 
 104. See Merritt, supra note 39, at 39. 
 105. Id. at 32 n.173. 
 106. HAMPTON LAWRENCE CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  ITS 
HISTORY 147 (1892). 
 107. 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 455. 
 108. Id. at 490. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 718 (1999) (describing the role of sovereign 
immunity discussions during ratification debates in Rhode Island, New York, and Virginia). 
 111. 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 456, 502. 
 112. Id. at 456; id. at 502 (“If they choose to indulge a part of their sovereign power to be 
exercised by the state governments, they may.”). 
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he listed it in his notes as among “‘Reasons for Adopting the 
Constitution.’”113
[T]o assure us of the intention of the framers of this constitution to 
preserve the individual sovereignty and independence of the States 
inviolate, we find it expressly declared by the 4th section of the 4th 
article, that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union, 
a republican form of government.”
  Yeates was more explicit in his reliance on the Clause:   
114
Others, beyond the walls of the ratifying conventions, also relied on the 
Guarantee Clause to assuage fears about the role of state sovereignty and 
popular sovereignty in the new nation, sometimes alluding to the 
relationship between the two.  Political economist Tench Coxe, under the 
pen name “A Freeman,” provides an illustrative discussion.  He observed 
that many were concerned about whether, under the new Constitution, 
“state sovereignties . . . would indeed be finally annihilated.”
 
115  In his 
view, however, states could not “be dispensed with” under the new 
constitution.116  “The states have, in the federal constitution, a guarantee of 
a separate republican form of government.”117  He also explained that one 
of the Constitution’s apparent strengths was that it embodied republican 
principles, “a never failing antidote to aristocracy, oligarchy and 
monarchy.”118  “[T]he sovereignty of the people is never to be infringed or 
destroyed.”119
Drawing on these principles, I argue that as the ultimate sovereign, the 
people have the final say over when a state may claim for itself the 
immunities of sovereignty.  On the other hand, to the extent lawsuits for 
damages unduly present the risk of impeding state integrity by undermining 
rather than furthering representative government and the people’s will, the 
Guarantee Clause presents a means for states to protect themselves from 
such suits.  The next part explores in practical terms how the Constitution’s 
guarantee of popular sovereignty and representative government—coupled 
with the Clause’s broader purpose of protecting state integrity—is critical to 
any comprehensive account about the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and 
the manner in which it should operate. 
 
 
 113. Merritt, supra note 39, at 32 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 439 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976)). 
 114. Id. at 31 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 43, at 
296–97). 
 115. Coxe Essays, supra note 102, at 89 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 91. 
 117. Id. at 97. 
 118. Id. at 94. 
 119. Id. at 95.  Immediately after one of his discussions of the Guarantee Clause, he noted 
that the Constitution could only be adopted and amended by votes of state legislatures, a 
perhaps inadvertent reminder that under the constitution, the people vested power in the 
states, who in turn delegated duties to the federal government, responsibilities that could be 
reclaimed under Article V. 
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II.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND REPUBLICANISM 
The Constitution’s guarantee of popular sovereignty and representative 
government commands concrete changes to the manner in which sovereign 
immunity operates.  Before outlining the precise contours of these changes, 
however, it is important to identify (1) whether or how current sovereign 
immunity doctrine threatens republicanism, and (2) whether or how 
eradicating state sovereign immunity threatens republicanism. 
A.  The Life and Legacy of State Sovereign Immunity 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State. 
United States Constitution, Eleventh Amendment120
While accounts of the Eleventh Amendment’s conception are oft told, it 
is important to review those accounts to understand how such a narrowly 
drawn amendment has lived such an excitingly dubious life. 
 
During the August 1792 Term of the Supreme Court, two citizens of 
South Carolina initiated a suit against the State of Georgia in the seminal 
case of Chisholm v. Georgia.121  Both of the South Carolina citizens were 
executors of a British creditor.122  Among the questions presented in the 
suit was whether “the State of Georgia, being one of the United States of 
America, [may] be made a party-defendant in any case, in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, at the suit of a private citizen, even although he 
himself is . . . a citizen of the State of South-Carolina?”123  Some members 
of the Court viewed this question as a jurisdictional matter, examining 
whether the heads of jurisdiction articulated in the Constitution and federal 
law authorized such suits.124  Others viewed the question as a more 
fundamental philosophical matter, in which the nation’s character, the 
definition of sovereignty, and the definition of republicanism were all on 
trial.125  After examining Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789,126
 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 the 
 121. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 122. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 93 (1922). 
 123. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420. 
 124. Id. at 466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law or practice of 
England, although perhaps it may be in some measure elucidated thereby, nor upon the law 
of any other country whatever; but upon the Constitution established by the people of the 
United States; and particularly upon the extent of powers given to the Federal Judicial in the 
2d section of the 3d article of the Constitution.”); see also id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting) 
(“The question, as I before observed, is,—will an action of assumpsit lie against a State?  If 
it will, it must be in virtue of the Constitution of the United States, and of some law of 
Congress conformable thereto.”). 
 125. See id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“[W]hen a State, by adopting the Constitution, 
has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, 
given up her right of sovereignty.”); id. at 457 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“[T]he citizens of 
Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a part of the ‘People of the 
United States,’ did not surrender the Supreme or sovereign Power to that State; but, as to the 
purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves.  As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, 
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Court famously—or infamously, depending on one’s perspective—ruled 
4-1 that such a suit could be brought.127
Under the traditional narrative, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chisholm “shocked the Nation,”
 
128 creating both the necessity and the 
momentum for the Eleventh Amendment’s passage.129  Indeed, the 
amendment was introduced just two days after Chisholm,130 proposed 
almost unanimously at Congress’s first opportunity,131 and ratified five 
years later.132  Even those who question the traditional view acknowledge 
that the decision fueled a sense of urgency in the debate on whether, and 
under what circumstances, states were amenable to civil suits.133
 
Georgia is NOT a sovereign State.”); id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“[W]e see the people 
acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a 
Constitution by which it was their will, that the State Governments should be bound, and to 
which the State Constitutions should be made to conform.”); see also id. at 457 (opinion of 
Wilson, J.) (“As a citizen, I know the Government of that State to be republican; and my 
short definition of such a Government is,—one constructed on this principle, that the 
Supreme Power resides in the body of the people.”); id. at 476 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“[T]rue 
Republican Government requires that free and equal citizens should have free, fair, and 
equal justice.”).  For an essay navigating the five opinions authored in Chisholm, see Randy 
E. Barnett, The People or the State?:  Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1729, 1733–34 (2007). 
 
 126. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 127. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 480 (“Ordered, that unless the said State shall either in 
due form appear, or [show] cause to the contrary in this Court, by the first day of next Term, 
judgment by default shall be entered against the said State.”). 
 128. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (1922) (“[Chisholm] fell upon the country 
with a profound shock.”). But see Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1926 (“Congress’s initial 
reaction to the Chisholm decision hardly demonstrates the sort of outrage so central to the 
profound shock thesis.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662 (“Sentiment for passage of a constitutional 
amendment to override the decision rapidly gained momentum.”); AMAR, supra note 2, at 
332 (“To appreciate the impulse animating this (the Eleventh) amendment, we need to 
understand the first constitutionally significant case ever decided by the Supreme Court, 
Chisholm v. Georgia.”); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign 
Immunity Doctrines:  Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 515 (1978) (“The one interpretation 
of the eleventh amendment to which everyone subscribes is that it was intended to overturn 
Chisholm v. Georgia.”); Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1034 (“The eleventh amendment was 
passed in the 1790’s in order to overrule a particular case—Chisholm v. Georgia.”); 
Manning, supra note 29, at 1680 (“No one questions that the nation adopted the Eleventh 
Amendment in response to Chisholm.”). 
 130. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 871 (6th ed. 2009). 
 131. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“[Chisholm] . . . created such a shock of 
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course 
adopted by the legislatures of the States.”). 
 132. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662. 
 133. Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail:  The Eleventh Amendment and the 
Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1584 (2009) 
(“Although the decision added urgency to this debate, the actual opinions in the case had 
little impact due to their public unavailability for months after the decision was handed 
down.”). 
2012] AWAKENING THE PEOPLE’S “GIANT” 1963 
Almost a century after the amendment’s passage, the Court interpreted its 
scope in the landmark case Hans v. Louisiana.134  By then, Congress 
permitted courts to resolve suits that involved federal questions, regardless 
of the parties’ citizenship.135  Relying on this entrée into federal court, a 
citizen of Louisiana sued the state under the federal constitutional clause 
that forbade states from “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”136  A 
Louisiana federal court dismissed the suit pursuant to sovereign 
immunity.137 
Reviewing that dismissal, the Supreme Court considered, for the first 
time, whether a citizen could sue his or her own state in federal court for 
violations of federal law.  Citing Federalist Papers, ratification debates, and 
the reaction to Chisholm, the Court concluded that the history of the 
Constitution broadly and the Eleventh Amendment specifically precluded 
such an action.  The Court explained that to permit citizens to sue their own 
states would be “no less startling and unexpected” than Chisholm.138  The 
Court concluded that in “light of history and experience and the established 
order of things,” permitting a suit against a state government was obnoxious 
to the common law and the intent fueling the Eleventh Amendment’s 
passage.139 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Court expanded 
sovereign immunity to cases launched in federal court pursuant to admiralty 
jurisdiction140 and Article III’s grant of jurisdiction to cases between a 
foreign state and the United States.141
Within the last two decades, the Supreme Court has further expanded 
sovereign immunity in three principal ways.  First, the Court has precluded 
 
 
 134. 134 U.S. 1 (1889). 
 135. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; see also Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1039 
n.15 (noting that “the Judiciary Act of 1801 conferred the first original general federal 
question jurisdiction on the federal courts, but it was repealed a year after its enactment” 
(citing Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132; Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89)). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  The state of Louisiana issued consolidated bonds in 
1874, and declared by legislation that each of the bonds “create[d] a valid contract between 
the state and each and every holder of said bonds, which the state shall by no means and in 
nowise impair.” Hans v. Louisiana, 24 F. 55, 55 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885). 
 137. Hans, 24 F. at 67–68.  In dismissing the suit, the court relied on Alexander Hamilton 
in Federalist No. 81 and James Madison’s pronouncements during ratification debates.  The 
Court was particularly persuaded, however, by the Eleventh Amendment.  “The reasons 
which prompted [the amendment], and the arguments which secured it, are equally strong 
against the citizen suing his own state, and against his suing any other state.  In both cases 
the exemption springs from the inability of a court to deal directly with the treasury of a 
state.” 
 138. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1890). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) (“[T]he immunity of a State from suit 
in personam in the admiralty brought by a private person without its consent, is clear.”); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”). 
 141. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321–24, 329–30 (1934); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to 
Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.”). 
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citizens from initiating lawsuits grounded in federal law against states in 
state court142 absent either express congressional authority or state 
consent.143  Second, the Court has effectively limited Congress’s power to 
abrogate sovereign immunity to instances where the legislation has 
“congruence and proportionality” to the constitutional violations Congress 
is attempting to remedy.144  Third, the Court has concluded that Congress 
may only abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Enforcement Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, 
Section 8.145 
It is important to note that this body of law does not preclude all suits 
against state conduct that violates federal law.146  There are two chief legal 
avenues through which plaintiffs may challenge such conduct.  First, a 
litigant may file a suit for injunctive relief against state officials,147 so long 
as the requested injunction does not command a state to dole out 
retrospective monetary payments.148  To successfully obtain injunctive 
relief, however, a plaintiff must not only show that the government’s illegal 
conduct has wronged her, but that the conduct will likely harm her 
again.149  Second, plaintiffs may seek damages actions against officials 
acting under color of state law.150  To successfully obtain damages from a 
state official, however, a plaintiff must show that the state official’s conduct 
violated clearly established law, a hurdle plaintiffs often cannot 
overcome.151
B.  With Sovereign Immunity:  Our Countermajoritarian Experiment 
 
1.  Departure from Statutory Text 
 In the late 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt, riding the wave of a 
considerable elective mandate for his party, successfully urged Congress to 
 
 142. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759 (1999). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 372 (2001) (quoting 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 145. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 146. See generally Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s so Afraid of the Eleventh 
Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 213 (2006) (describing the alternate ways plaintiffs may challenge a state official’s 
lawless conduct). 
 147. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 125 (1908) (“While the courts cannot control the 
exercise of the discretion of an executive officer, an injunction preventing such officer from 
enforcing an unconstitutional statute is not an interference with his discretion.”). 
 148. See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 149. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 151. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (concluding 
that while it was unconstitutional to strip search a thirteen-year-old girl on an apparently 
false report that she possessed two ibuprofen tablets, the search did not violate clearly 
established law); Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792–93 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that it did not violate clearly established law to repeatedly tase an unarmed, 
handcuffed, and sobbing man who refused to sign a traffic citation). 
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pass the Fair Labor Standards Act.152  It passed the House 291–89, and 
cleared the Senate on a full-throated voice vote.153  Popular sovereignty and 
representative government were in action.154  The Act required, among 
other things, the payment of a minimum wages to employees155 and was 
later amended to include overtime pay provisions.156  Further, the Act 
contained a private cause of action, giving employees a legal weapon to 
wield if an employer opted to defy the law.157  A few decades later, the 
Court remarked that congressional legislation must evince a clear intent to 
abrogate states’ immunity in order to permit damages lawsuits against 
them.158  In 1974, Congress responded by amending the Act to provide that 
the term employer included “the government of a State or political 
subdivision thereof [or] any agency of . . . a State, or a political subdivision 
of a State.”159
In 1996, John Alden and a group of other probation officers in Maine 
sought to avail themselves of the law that their duly elected representatives 
passed.
 
160  The group brought a lawsuit in state court, alleging that the state 
of Maine failed to pay them overtime as the Act required.  The suit faced an 
uphill climb; the Supreme Court had already ruled that Congress could not 
abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.161  
However, Alden relied on the language of the Eleventh Amendment.”162  
Simply put, he contended that an amendment expressly addressing the 
“Judicial power of the United States” extended only to the judicial power of 
the United States, and not to suits brought in state courts.163
Alden’s quest failed.  The Maine Supreme Court ruled that “[i]f Congress 
cannot force the states to defend in federal court against claims by private 
individuals, it similarly cannot force the states to defend in their own courts 
against these same claims.”
 
164  The Supreme Court affirmed.165  The effect 
was that despite the fact that the republican process produced a statutory 
right to overtime pay, state employees like Alden were without a 
compensable remedy if their states chose to ignore the law.  And while 
injunctive relief may prove an adequate remedy in some contexts,166
 
 152. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR:  INTO THE STORM, 1937–1940:  A HISTORY 218–19 (1993). 
 that 
 153. Id. 
 154. See generally WILLIS J. NORDLUND, THE QUEST FOR A LIVING WAGE:  THE HISTORY 
OF THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE PROGRAM (1997). 
 155. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060. 1062–63 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006)). 
 156. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 
 157. § 16, 52 Stat. at 1069 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). 
 158. Emps. of the Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 
279, 281, 285 (1973). 
 159. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). 
 160. Alden v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998), aff’d, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 174. 
 163. See generally Alden, 527 U.S. 706. 
 164. Alden, 715 A.2d at 174. 
 165. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
 166. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional 
Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007). 
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was not the case for Alden and those in his position.  He would never 
receive compensation for denied overtime pay.167
In this way, Alden is similar to state employees like Patricia Garrett, a 
breast cancer survivor who sued the state of Alabama for alleged 
employment discrimination by the University of Alabama.  Invoking the 
Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court dismissed her suit on the grounds 
that the Americans with Disabilities Act was not “congruent and 
proportional” to the state constitutional violations Congress sought to 
remedy.
 
168  Also like Alden, J. Daniel Kimel, Jr. sued the state of Florida 
for compensatory relief authorized by the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act.169  Citing the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court 
dismissed Kimel’s suit too, striking down portions of the Act while 
depriving him of the benefits his elected representatives sought to award 
him.170
In each of these moments, the Court did more than deny individual 
plaintiffs the ability to file a suit.  Rather, the Court overturned provisions 
of legislation enacted by Congress that expressly granted citizens the right 
to file suit.  To be sure, courts have long assumed the role of declaring 
unconstitutional statutes invalid.  But in these instances, the Court went 
further.  As discussed below, it overturned democratically enacted 
legislation while openly stating that the result was not dictated by the only 
constitutional provision that explicitly exempts states from certain lawsuits. 
 
2.  Departure from the Constitutional Text 
The Court has long acknowledged that the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment does not in and of itself compel a ban on citizens suing their 
states for violating federal law.  An early and explicit acknowledgment of 
this appears in Hans v. Louisiana.171  There, the Court concluded that 
citizens could not sue their own states for violations of federal law.172
 
 167. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs may seek damages against state officials, but as 
others have made clear, this is often inadequate, because such suits often fail under qualified 
immunity principles. See generally id. at 1918, 1920. 
  In 
doing so, the court rejected two plausible textual readings of the 
amendment, both of which have been thoroughly explored by scholars. 
  In the particular case of John Alden and his fellow probation officers, other barriers 
stood in the way of a successful Section 1983 suit.  First, under Maine law, the State rather 
than any identifiable official was charged with providing overtime pay. See Pamela S. 
Karlan, The Irony of Immunity:  The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 
1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1328–29 (2001) (explaining Alden’s quandary).  Second, at 
the time, at least one federal court of appeals had ruled that § 1983 suits were impermissible 
in light of Fair Labor Standards Act’s carefully calibrated compensatory scheme. Id. at 1323 
(citing Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 168. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 169. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 70 (2000). 
 170. Id. at 92. 
 171. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1889) (putting forth both plausible textual interpretations of the 
amendment and stating, “It is true, the amendment does so read”). 
 172. Id.; see also supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
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a.  Plain Meaning 
One textual interpretation has been termed the “plain meaning” 
approach,173 and is often associated with Lawrence Marshall.174  Under this 
theory, the “essentially unambiguous dictates of the amendment’s 
language” prohibit federal jurisdiction over a state.175  The principal 
consequence of this reading is that even if an “out-of-state citizen brings the 
case [arising] under federal question[] jurisdiction, the suit is” 
impermissible.176  Further, under Marshall’s reading, the language of the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar citizens from suing their own states 
under any applicable head of federal jurisdiction—including federal 
questions177 and admiralty.178
To support this reading, Professor Marshall has posited that the 
distinction drawn in the Eleventh Amendment between in-state and out-of-
state plaintiffs was intentional.
 
179  He has noted that a number of claims 
existed at the time against vulnerable states by out-of-state defendants, and 
that the drafters might have wanted to protect those states while still giving 
litigants the chance to hold states accountable for violations of the 
Constitution.180  Out-of-state plaintiffs had initiated land claims against 
Virginia, seeking to make land grants using almost two million acres of 
property in Virginia.181
 
 173. Id. 
  Similarly, much of the southern states’ war debt 
 174. See Marshall, supra note 29, at 1371; see also Manning, supra note 29, at 1750.  
Professor John Manning does not state whether he finds the “plain meaning” or diversity 
explanation more persuasive.  Finding both possibilities plausible, he has presented a 
modified version of the argument that sovereign immunity is limited to the categories of 
cases enumerated by the Eleventh Amendment’s text.  The alternative view found in current 
doctrine—that the Eleventh Amendment simply serves as evidence of the importance of 
sovereign immunity—is too quick to ignore two canons of interpretation:  the specificity 
canon and the expressio unius canon. Manning, supra note 29, at 1671.  Under the 
specificity canon, a specific reference in legislation will govern an earlier, more general 
reference. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).  And 
under the expressio unius maxim, “the mention of some implies the exclusion of others not 
mentioned.” See United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 (2001).  
Applying either canon, Manning contends that Alden and its predecessors overlook the 
likelihood that the “Eleventh Amendment carries a negative implication, precluding judicial 
recognition of additional categories of state sovereign immunity under the general authority 
of Article III or the constitutional structure.”  See Manning, supra note 29, at 1671; see also 
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648 (2001).  Bradford Clark has characterized Manning’s view as the 
“compromise theory.” Clark, supra note 29, at 1832. 
 175. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1346. 
 176. Id. at 1346. 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
 179. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1362. 
 180. The original Constitution does, after all, contain express limitations on state power. 
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 181. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1362–63; see Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
378, 382 (1798).  During the Virginia Ratification Convention, delegate George Mason 
expressed concerns that if the land grant plaintiffs prevailed, it would “introduce a scene of 
distress and confusion never heard of before.  Our peasants will be, like those mentioned by 
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was held by out-of-state speculators, “whom many states had a strong 
aversion to paying.”182  Still, a number of Framers, Hamilton among them, 
believed that federal courts had to have the power to “restrain or correct the 
infractions” of the Constitution, including infractions committed by 
states.183
b.  Diversity Explanation 
  The Eleventh Amendment struck that balance. 
The second plausible technical reading has been termed the “diversity 
explanation,” and is most associated with Judge John Gibbons184 and Judge 
William A. Fletcher.185  Judge Fletcher has described the explanation this 
way:  rather than “forbidding” lawsuits against states by foreign citizens, 
foreign subjects, and out-of-state citizens, the amendment instead “fail[ed] 
to authorize” these forms of diversity jurisdiction.186  As observed, Article 
III provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . .  and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”187  
Under the diversity explanation, the Eleventh Amendment iterates that this 
language from Article III does not authorize federal courts to hear cases 
against states initiated by citizens of other states or foreign citizens.  Such 
iteration was necessary to overrule the Supreme Court’s construction of the 
Diversity Clause of Article III in Chisholm.  In the words of Judge Gibbons, 
the amendment “did nothing more than amend article III, section 2 of the 
Constitution to eliminate the power of federal courts to hear suits against 
states in which the sole basis for jurisdiction was the status of the 
parties.”188
The chief consequence of the diversity explanation is that when a suit 
against a state commences in federal court pursuant to federal question 
jurisdiction or admiralty jurisdiction, the language of the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar the suit
 
189
 
Virgil, reduced to ruin and misery, driven from their farms, and obliged to leave their 
country.” Marshall, supra note 
 regardless of the plaintiff’s place of 
citizenship.  This is not to say that such suits would necessarily be 
permissible if the Court embraced the diversity explanation.  But if such 
suits are not permitted, a source other than the Eleventh Amendment’s text 
must give rise to this proscription. 
29, at 1364. 
 182. Marshall, supra note 29, at 1366. 
 183. Id. at 1367 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 1, at 568 (Alexander 
Hamiltion)). 
 184. Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1926–38. 
 185. William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment:  A 
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1274 (1989) (arguing that the clause simply 
explained the metes and bounds of the diversity provision in Article III); see also U.S 
CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or 
more States . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.”). 
 186. See Fletcher, supra note 185, at 1274 (emphasis omitted). 
 187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 188. Gibbons, supra note 29, at 1894. 
 189. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1060. 
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c.  Background Principle of Sovereign Immunity 
Despite the long-running disagreement between proponents of the plain 
meaning thesis and proponents of the diversity thesis, there is at least one 
point on which they agree.  The text of the Eleventh Amendment says 
nothing about a citizen suing her own state for violations of federal law.  As 
such, the Hans Court rejected both of these plausible readings of the 
Eleventh Amendment’s scope when it concluded that citizens cannot sue 
their own states in actions arising under federal law.  The Court explained 
that to permit citizens to sue their own states pursuant to federal question 
jurisdiction would be “no less startling and unexpected” than Chisholm.190  
In “light of history and experience and the established order of things,” the 
Court concluded that permitting a suit against a state government was 
obnoxious to the common law, the Federalist Papers, and the intent fueling 
the Eleventh Amendment’s passage.191  At a minimum, the Eleventh 
Amendment stood as one piece of evidence among others that private 
citizens could not sue their own states under federal question jurisdiction. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, relying on similar reasoning, 
the Court further expanded sovereign immunity in a number of ways.  
Among these expansions, the Court held that immunity applied in federal 
cases initiated against states pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction.192  Then, in 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,193 the Court held that states were 
also immune from suits filed pursuant to Article III’s grant of jurisdiction to 
cases between a foreign state and the United States.194  The Court reasoned 
in Principality of Monaco that “[b]ehind the words” of Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment “are postulates which limit and control.”195  These 
limiting principles include the “postulate that States of the Union, still 
possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without 
their consent, save where there has been ‘a surrender of this immunity in the 
plan of the convention.’”196
The high-water mark of the Court’s expansion of sovereign immunity, 
however, occurred roughly a century after Hans, in Alden.  The Court found 
that Congress may not permit citizens to sue states for violations of federal 
laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, even when that suit was 
initiated in state court.  Bolstering this view, the Court provided its most 
recent detailed description of the operative historical narrative that sustains 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  According to the Alden Court, it was 
well-established at the Founding that 
 
 
 190. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1889). 
the English King “could not be sued 
 191. Id. at 14–15. 
 192. Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 
1. 
 193. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
 194. Id. at 321–24, 329–30 (1934); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial 
Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”). 
 195. Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322. 
 196. Id. at 322–23 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
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without [his] consent,”197 but that English lords could be subjected to suit.  
As a result, the ratification debates were rife with concerns about whether 
the creation of a new, sovereign federal government would subject states, 
like the British lords, to suit in a “higher” court.198 
Constitutional drafters and promoters assured states—both in the 
Federalist Papers and in ratification conventions—that the Constitution 
maintained sovereign immunity for states.199  Alexander Hamilton 
expressed in Federalist No. 81 that private suits against states in federal 
court, at least for debts that states owed, would amount to an 
“unwarrantable” “war against the contracting State.”200  Similarly, during 
the Virginia Ratification Convention, both James Madison and John 
Marshall pledged that despite its language, Article III, Section 2, did not 
permit suits by citizens of one state against another state without that state’s 
consent.201  At most, Madison explained, the section permitted citizens to 
bring such a suit, but the defendant-state would have the prerogative to 
object.202 
The views of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall were not unanimous.203  
James Wilson championed the position that “[w]hen a citizen has a 
controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both 
parties may stand on a just and equal footing.”204  Still, the Alden Court 
concluded that the prevailing impression of the ratifying states, in light of 
according assurances, was that they would not be subject to suit.205
The Alden Court also supported its view by pointing to the “structure of 
the original Constitution” and the “essential principles of federalism” 
 
 
 197. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419, 437–46 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979) 
(“The immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been 
enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries.  Only the sovereign’s own consent could 
qualify the absolute character of that immunity.”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*234–35. 
 198. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715; Hall, 440 U.S. at 414; see also CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1–40 (1972). 
 199. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716. 
 200. Id. at 717 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 201. Id. at 717–18 (citing 3 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 533 (James Madison)). 
 202. Id. (“It appears to me that this [clause] can have no operation but this—to give a 
citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, 
this court may take cognizance of it.” (citing 3 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 533 
(James Madison)). 
 203. See JACOBS, supra note 198, at 40 (“[T]he legislative history of the Constitution 
hardly warrants the conclusion drawn by some that there was a general understanding, at the 
time of ratification, that the states would retain their sovereign immunity.”). 
 204. Hall, 440 U.S. at 419 n.17 (citing 3 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 555). 
 205. Alden, 527 U.S. at 718–19.  The Court relied on declarations made during ratifying 
conventions.  For example, the Rhode Island Convention proclaimed that “[i]t is declared by 
the Convention, that the judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be 
a party, does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person 
against a state.” Id. at 718 (quoting 1 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 336).  Similarly, the 
New York Convention declared that “the judicial power of the United States, in cases in 
which a state may be a party, does not extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any 
suit by any person against a state.” Id. at 718–19 (quoting 1 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, 
at 329). 
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reflected in that structure.206  The Court summarily cited Article IV—where 
the Guarantee Clause is found—to support its structural argument.  The 
Court explained:  “Various textual provisions of the Constitution assume 
the States’ continued existence and active participation in the fundamental 
processes of governance.207
To be sure, the Alden Court appreciated that lawsuits against states 
present real challenges to representative government.  “If the principle of 
representative government is to be preserved to the States,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “the balance between competing interests must be reached 
after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the 
State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and 
invoked by the private citizen.”
  Thus, in one broad sweep, the Court cited 
Article IV as if each of its clauses—including the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the Guarantee Clause—were all 
equally relevant to the question of state sovereign immunity.  In doing so, it 
missed a moment to focus on the clause most relevant to the “processes of 
governance”:  the Guarantee Clause.  Derivatively, it failed to grapple with 
the tension that exists between the notions that the people and the states 
wield the ultimate power in our federal system. 
208  Yet, this statement is wrought with 
irony.  In the same opinion, by judicial decree, the Court held that a portion 
of a statute passed by our political processes could not stand because of a 
constitutional “background principle.”209
“Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress,” the Court has 
stated, is “‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon 
to perform.’”
 
210
C.  Money Motivates 
  However, this principle is hard to reconcile with the fall of 
congressionally passed abrogation provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  Is overturning democratically enacted legislation, while 
denying damages to aggrieved citizens for violations of federal law, a 
necessary cost of sovereign immunity?  Or might there be another 
recalibration of the doctrine that accounts both for the costs to 
representative government inherent in permitting all suits against states, and 
the costs inherent in disallowing all such suits? 
For centuries, state-sanctioned American apartheid represented a defiant 
denunciation of republican ideals.  Popular sovereignty is threatened by a 
system that arbitrarily locks groups out of full participation in public life.  
At its absolute extreme, to arbitrarily deny a group of people full political 
participation is to approach a monarchial form of government, for a 
monarchy consigns all power in the hands of one at the expense of the rest.  
 
 206. Id. at 748. 
 207. Id. at 713 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997)). 
 208. Id. at 751. 
 209. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). 
 210. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–18 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring) 
(quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring)). 
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Short of that extreme, unreasonably denying a group of people a full and 
equal public voice is often tantamount to an aristocratic cabal, for it places 
power in the hands of a few at the expense of the many.  It is perhaps for 
this reason that Chief Justice John Jay defined republican government in 
Chisholm as one where “free and equal citizens should have free, fair, and 
equal justice.”211  Absent this equality, one or more people likely are 
“usurping . . . and fraudulently weilding [sic] more than [their] share of the 
popular sovereignty.”212
In 1954, the Supreme Court brought America closer to the equality ideal 
when it required de jure integration of public schools.
 
213  Still, the bulk of 
school districts throughout the South failed to integrate until the 1960s or 
later.214  Recently, four economists have shed considerable light on why 
this occurred.215  Isolating key alternative variables, their article 
demonstrates that nearly half of desegregated school districts were 
motivated by Congress’s decision to tie conditional grants to states in 
exchange for, as they put it, “[d]ismantling the dual system of education in 
the South.”216  The authors explain that school boards had their price.217  
To integrate in a meaningful way, a district needed to be paid, on average, 
$1,200 per pupil by the federal government.218
These findings, coupled with the reality that municipalities were not 
subject to damages suits during that period,
 
219 suggest that the threat of 
private suits for injunctive relief was not sufficient to cajole school districts 
into obeying their constitutional command.  Monetary incentives—and their 
close cousin, monetary sanctions—against governments, can meaningfully 
motivate state actors to obey the law when other potential motivators 
fail.220
 
 211. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 
 212. This language comes from Steinwehr v. State, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 586 (1858) 
(explaining the purpose of a law prohibiting individuals from voting more than once). 
 213. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 214. Elizabeth Cascio et al., Paying for Progress:  Conditional Grants and the 
Desegregation of Southern Schools, 125 Q.J. ECON. 445, 446 (2010). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 467. 
 218. Id. at 467, 448. 
 219. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 220. This deterrent effect—combined with this Article’s observations that money 
damages against states will both compensate plaintiffs and clarify law where injunctive 
claims and Section 1983 claims fail—strongly suggests that money damages against states 
matter; engagement with and critique of sovereign immunity jurisprudence is a meaningful 
endeavor.  For a different point of view, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh 
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1998) (arguing that most critiques of 
sovereign immunity doctrine “neglect[] a crucial fact:  The Eleventh Amendment almost 
never matters”). See also Choper & Yoo, supra note 146.  Choper and Yoo argue that 
Section 1983 suits serve to establish the metes and bounds of legal conduct; and because of 
qualified immunity, they argue, this constitutional clarification occurs in a less costly manner 
than damages suits against states. Id. at 229–31. 
  Both their article and Jeffries’s were written before Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223 (2009), a case that will likely reduce instances of constitutional interpretation in Section 
1983 claims, thereby increasing the need for clarification of constitutional rules outside the 
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Local school districts, it should be recognized, are not “states” within the 
meaning of sovereign immunity jurisprudence.221  But they present a useful 
analogy to explore the ways monetary factors can incentivize constitutional 
conduct.  Before Monell v. City of New York in 1978, plaintiffs generally 
could not sue municipal governments for violations of federal rights 
because they were deemed not to be “persons” within the meaning of the 
relevant statute.222
This lesson is worth taking into account when shaping our republican 
ideal of what sovereign immunity should look like.  Would schools have 
integrated before the late 1960s if monetary damages had been in the 
arsenal of wronged minority children throughout the South?  As noted, such 
damages were not available against municipalities, due to principles of 
statutory interpretation, or against the states, due to sovereign immunity.  
Outside the educational contexts, would de jure racial equality have 
happened more quickly if lawsuits had been permitted to vindicate the types 
of psychic and economic harms that state-sponsored apartheid likely 
exacted?  We will never know. 
 
D.  Without Sovereign Immunity:  A Thought Experiment 
The above examples illustrate sovereign immunity’s tension with 
republican precepts of representative government and popular sovereignty.  
This tension could lead one to question the very legitimacy of sovereign 
immunity.  What if the Supreme Court did away with the doctrine except as 
expressly enumerated in the Eleventh Amendment?  As a threshold matter, 
such a ruling would invite its own questions about the meaning of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The Court could plausibly adopt one of the two 
textual theories that have traditionally predominated in the academic 
literature as to how to interpret or apply the Eleventh Amendment.223
1.  Monetary Judgments 
  
Under either approach, however, if the Court eradicated sovereign 
immunity in all other circumstances, this could undermine majoritarianism 
and representative government in ways that call out for discussion. 
A state’s ability to control its own treasury has long been considered 
foundational to a state’s ability to protect its stability and, for that matter, its 
existence. It is axiomatic that “the power to tax involves the power to 
destroy,” for control over a state’s treasury includes the power to control a 
 
context of Section 1983. See generally id.  After Pearson, courts may dismiss damages cases 
if the right that the defendant violated was not clearly established, and under those 
circumstances, courts have no obligation to assess whether a constitutional right was indeed 
violated.  This effectively means that determinations about the legality of conduct will occur 
less frequently. See Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 
1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
523, 546 (2010). 
 221. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 680 (1978). 
 222. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188–91. 
 223. See supra Part II.B. 
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state’s “most important and most valuable interests.”224  The ability to 
compel a state to pay money damages from a state’s treasury, with few if 
any limits, invites analogous concerns.225
The power to sue a state for monetary damages is not only license to 
deplete a state’s resources, but also to command that state to allocate its 
limited resources in ways unauthorized by the people’s duly elected state 
representatives.
 
226  To sue a state is, in effect, to sue the people of that state 
who have collectively contributed to its coffers and elected representatives 
to tend to the public fisc.  As the Supreme Court explained in Alden, such 
cases thereby threaten “the principle of representative government” because 
“money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to 
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.”227
History fortifies these concerns.  There is a reason that states would have, 
in the words of Hamilton, considered it an act of “war” to permit suits 
against states in federal court.
 
228  As other commentators have explained in 
impressive detail, states faced staggering debts totaling many millions of 
dollars in the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.229  And there 
are credible reasons to believe that if courts had permitted individuals—
state citizens or otherwise—to recover on those debts, this would have 
threatened states’ survival and ability to govern.  Virginia’s debt in the 
aftermath of the Civil War is illustrative.  The state’s $47,090,867230 debt 
led the state to issue “coupons” of dubious value to citizen creditors, 
coupons that ultimately turned out to be virtually worthless in practice.231
 
 224. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819). 
  
And lest one conclude that an American state will never face such 
debilitating fiscal conditions again, California’s 2009 decision to issue non-
negotiable instruments called Registered Warrants (or IOUs) when it was 
 225. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (“The circumstances which are necessary 
to produce an alienation of state sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of 
taxation, and need not be repeated here.”). 
 226. Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2594 (2009) (“States and local governments have 
limited funds.  When a federal court orders that money be appropriated for one program, the 
effect is often to take funds away from other important programs.”). 
 227. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750–51 (1999). 
 228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 229. See Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 212, 213 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court helped the South out of its 
staggering, multi-million dollar post-Civil War debt crisis.”) (reviewing JOHN V. ORTH, THE 
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 
406 (1821) (“It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the states 
were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the 
federal courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.”). 
 230. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (1987).  This 
translates into about $760 million in purchasing power today, and about $88 billion when 
taken as a portion of today’s Nominal Gross Domestic Product. Samuel H. Williamson, 
Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present,, 
MEASURINGWORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited Mar. 23, 
2012) (enter 1870 as Initial Year, 47090867 with no commas as Initial Amount, and 2012 as 
Desired Year). 
 231. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883); 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Part 2, at 714–19 (2009). 
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unable to meet its financial obligations should, at the least, caution against 
such unmitigated confidence.232 
2.  Execution of Judgments 
As the Supreme Court has observed, executing judgments against states 
could “[endanger] government buildings or property which the State 
administers on the public’s behalf.”233  It is not uncommon for a court to 
award property to a litigant in execution of a judgment.234  And there are, in 
fact, examples of courts awarding government property to litigants in 
execution of judgments.235  In Estate of DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, 
Illinois,236 a court awarded a park and city hall building to a litigant in 
execution of a judgment.  Similarly, in Meriwether v. Garrett,237 a lower 
court awarded state property to a litigant in execution of a judgment against 
a city.238
On appeal, in Debow, an Illinois appellate court found that awarding city 
hall to a litigant violated state public policy, though that court 
simultaneously upheld the portion of the same execution order that awarded 
a litigant a city park.
 
239  And in Meriwether, the Supreme Court relied on 
the state’s “public character” to reverse portions of the execution order at 
issue there.240  Still, it is unclear what, in the absence of the Court’s robust 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, would have supported the “public 
character” thesis. 
Under Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in admiralty cases, 
before a single motion on the merits has been filed, a court may place a 
litigant’s assets “up to the amount sued for—in the hands of a garnishee” 
3.  Admiralty Claims and Attachment 
 
 232. See Steven E.F. Brown, California Cash Falls Short of New Budget Targets, SAN 
JOSE BUS. J. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2009/09/07/
daily60.html (describing $862 million in “registered warrants” and $471 million in 
rescheduled payments in light of a $12.6 billion cash deficit). 
 233. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999). 
 234. DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.3 (2d ed. 1993); see, e.g., Aebig v. Cox, No. 
258505, 2006 WL 1360504, at *1 (Mich. App. May 18, 2006) (affirming award of real 
property in execution of a judgment); see also Bradley J.B. Toben & Elizabeth A. Toben, 
Using Turnover Relief to Reach the Nonexempt Paycheck, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 195, 195 
(1988). 
 235. Murphree v. City of Mobile, 108 Ala. 663 (1895) (awarding land belonging to a city 
in execution of a judgment). 
 236. 228 Ill. App. 3d 437 (1992). But see Brazil v. City of Chicago, 43 N.E.2d 212, 214 
(1942) (“However strong the obligation of a town or city to pay its debts, . . . to allow 
payment to be enforced by execution would so far impair the usefulness and power of the 
corporation, in the discharge of its government functions, that the public good required the 
denial of such a right.”). 
 237. 102 U.S. 472 (1880). 
 238. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal O. Picker, When Cities Go Broke:  A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 436 (1993) 
(describing the factual background leading to Meriwether). 
 239. Estate of DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, Ill., 592 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (1992). 
 240. Meriwether, 102 U.S. at 501. 
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when the litigant “is not found within [a] district.”241  To be sure, cases 
against states sounding in admiralty would likely be rare even with a 
background principle of no sovereign immunity—especially cases in which 
a state is sued in another state.  But before the Court concluded in 1921 that 
the Eleventh Amendment barred admiralty suits, litigants sometimes 
initiated suits under that head of federal jurisdiction.242  Accordingly, it is 
worth at least acknowledging that attachment of a state’s tax dollars, before 
a finding of liability, would be a theoretical possibility under a return to that 
regime.243
There are, therefore, threats to popular sovereignty and representative 
government inherent in allowing all damages suits, and threats to popular 
sovereignty and representative government inherent in disallowing all 
damages suits.  A jurisprudence fully consistent with the Guarantee Clause 
must, then, give due weight to both of these considerations.  At present, the 
Court appreciates the first at the expense of the second. 
 
E.  Popular Sovereignty and State Sovereignty 
Some scholars and jurists have argued that sovereign immunity is 
anathema to the very concept of popular sovereignty.244  For example, 
Professor Amar has argued that sovereign immunity is “wholly antithetical 
to the Constitution’s organizing principle of popular sovereignty.”245  He 
argues that in the American system, sovereignty is vested in one people:  
the People of the United States,246 not “thirteen [or fifty] distinct Peoples” 
or governments.247  This view had an early proponent in Justice Wilson in 
Chisholm v. Georgia.248
This argument does not, however, fully engage the relationship between 
popular sovereignty and state sovereignty in America’s federalist system of 
government.  There is evidence that the Founders intended the two terms to 
be inextricably linked.
 
249
 
 241. FED. R. CIV. P. B(1)(a) (supplemental rule). 
  Consider Madison’s statements in Federalist No. 
 242. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) (“[T]he immunity of a State from suit 
in personam in the admiralty brought by a private person without its consent, is clear.”); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”). 
 243. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006) (permitting pre-judgment attachment of foreign nations’ 
assets in cases arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but providing for 
restrictions on such attachments); see also Ernest Mabuza, State Assets Law Gets Extension, 
BUS. DAY (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=80170 
(noting that South Africa’s Constitutional Court ruled to permit attachment of state assets to 
pay debts). 
 244. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 1202 (“Sovereign immunity is inconsistent 
with a central maxim of American government:  no one, not even the government, is above 
the law.”); see also id. at 1204–06. 
 245. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987) 
(citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.); see also id. at 1425–66. 
 246. Id. at 1450.  
 247. Id. 
 248. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793). 
 249. As noted, one stark example of how individuals at the founding saw popular 
sovereignty as highly related to sovereignty appears in a work by “Fabius,” a Federalist.  He 
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39, where he describes how the Constitution would transform from a 
draft250 to the supreme legal document of the Land.  He states that the 
document would become law “on the assent and ratification of the people of 
America.”251  But he also added that “the people” would ratify the 
Constitution “not as individuals composing one entire nation; but as 
composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively 
belong.”252  The Constitution itself reflects a similar duality.  While the 
Constitution opens by describing itself as a charter for “We the People,” in 
Article VII, the drafters called the document a “Constitution between the 
States.”253  And Article VII expressly affirmed that the document would 
become operable upon being “Done in Convention by the Unanimous 
Consent of the States” present in 1787.254
Other contemporaneous writings similarly illustrate the symbiotic 
relationship between popular and state sovereignty in the American system.  
On one hand, John Jay casually observed that it was “the people” who 
would decide the question of whether to ratify the Constitution
 
255 and 
Hamilton contended that “[the] fundamental principle of republican 
government . . . admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the 
established Constitutions.”256  “The power of the people,” he added, “is 
superior” to the legislative and judicial branches.257  On the other hand, in 
Federalist No. 32, Hamilton also espoused the view that if the Constitution 
were enacted, “the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of 
sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that act 
exclusively delegated to the United States.”258  But if it is true that:  (1) in a 
system based upon popular sovereignty, the only legitimate fountain of 
authority flows from the people; and (2) the constitutional pact “between 
the states” itself was premised on states retaining and relinquishing “rights 
of sovereignty,” then one of two conclusions necessarily follows.  Either the 
entire Constitution is illegitimate or the people may express its collective 
will through states259
 
wrote:  “It has been unanimously agreed by the friends of liberty, that frequent elections of 
the representatives of the people, are the sovereign remedy of all grievances in a free 
government.” FABIUS, supra note 
 and confer elements of its sovereignty on those states.  
52, at 62. 
 250. According to Madison, before ratification, the document’s authors had only 
“‘proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it 
is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed.  [The 
proposal] was to be submitted to the people themselves.’” AMAR, supra note 2, at 8 (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 283–84 (James Madison)); see also id. at 506 n.5 
(collecting other historical references to the pre-ratification document as a draft or proposal). 
 251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 1, at 273 (James Madison). 
 252. Id. (emphasis added). 
 253. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 254. Id. 
 255. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay). 
 256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 257. Id. at 557. 
 258. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 1, at 217 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis 
added and omitted). 
 259. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 
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Given the choice, most would likely embrace the latter view.260
And even if one rejects the view that popular sovereignty is inherently 
inclusive of state sovereignty in the American system,
  Popular 
sovereignty and state sovereignty are not inherently antithetical to one 
another.  Under our constitutional design, the people have the power to vest 
in states certain powers and immunities attendant to sovereignty. 
261 the more crucial 
point is that the Guarantee Clause’s text is still the best constitutional ally 
for much of the court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence for this reason:  
If state sovereignty does exist in a system of self-government, it could only 
be because the people vested them with this sovereignty.262
III.  DEMOCRATIZING THE DOCTRINE 
 
The text of the Eleventh Amendment places jurisdictional limitations on 
lawsuits against states.  The proper textual approach to understanding that 
jurisdictional limitation is the subject of a long-running scholarly debate.263
Prudential, extra-textual limitations on judicial power are a familiar 
feature of American law.  The Constitution, for example, says nothing 
about when citizens may sue government officials in Constitution-based 
lawsuits for damages.  Yet, as discussed below, courts have refused to hear 
  
This part engages a different question, offering proposals as to how courts 
should manage suits against states that fall outside of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s jurisdictional limitations on “the Judicial power of the United 
States.” 
 
(1954) (“[T]he states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, 
the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical determinants of national as 
well as local politics.”). 
 260. See 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 470 (James Wilson) (“[T]his 
Constitution . . . is laid before the citizens of the United States, unfettered by restraint . . . .  
By their fiat, it will become of value and authority; without it, it will never receive the 
character of authenticity and power.”).  For a general discussion on constitutional legitimacy, 
see Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 123 (2003).  For 
a discussion of the legitimacy of a Constitution that excluded a majority of inhabitants from 
central aspects of the social contract—including women and all who were not white—see 
Vine Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REV. 917, 918–20 (1986); 
Thurgood Marshall, Commentary:  Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987) (describing how slavery undermined legitimacy of 
the original document). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 
n.2 (2d ed. 1988) (writing that Justice Marshall’s statement is a “radical overstatement” in 
light of, among other reasons, the Constitution’s amendments). 
 261. For example, one could conceivably, despite the language of Article VII, conclude 
that the Constitution is not a “Constitution between the States.”  And one could conclude that 
Hamilton’s description of the constitutional pact—one where states relinquished and retained 
certain powers of state sovereignty—is simply wrong. 
 262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 253 (James Madison) (explaining that the 
“genius of republican liberty . . . demand[s] . . . that all power should be derived from the 
people”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 1, at 270 (James Madison) (describing the 
American system as a “government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly” from 
the majority); see also 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 456 (James Wilson) (noting that 
while some believed “supreme power reside[d] in the states . . . [he believed] that it 
reside[d] in the people” and that they should not surrender it to “any government 
whatsoever”). 
 263. See supra Part II.C. 
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such suits against federal and state officials unless the defendants violated 
clearly established law.264  This calibration emerged as the Court sought to 
honor and balance competing constitutional principles.265
If courts weighed the principles animating the Guarantee Clause more 
heavily in applying sovereign immunity, at least two doctrinal changes 
should flow from that shift.  The first relates to the circumstances in which 
courts infer that a state has consented to suit.  The second relates to the 
class of cases that the doctrine reaches.  Guiding both changes would be the 
text of the Guarantee Clause, as a vessel of popular sovereignty and 
representative government. 
  In the context of 
sovereign immunity, a similar calibration of competing constitutional 
principles is warranted.  Ranking high among these principles are those that 
Article IV, Section 4 fortifies:  protection of state integrity through its 
guarantee of representative government. 
A.  State Consent as Consent of the Governed 
1.  Congressional Abrogation 
Under the current doctrine, Congress may permissibly abrogate state 
sovereign immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so266 and 
“act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.”267  As noted, 
Congress generally may not premise abrogation of a state’s immunity on 
Article I powers.268  Abrogation may occur, however, pursuant to Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment if the statute is congruent and proportional to 
the constitutional violations remedied.269
“State consent” to suit, as currently construed, is exceedingly difficult to 
prove, as Edelman v. Jordan
  Finally, absent this abrogation, 
states must “consent” before facing a lawsuit. 
270 illustrates.271
 
 264. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
  There, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that as a matter of law, Illinois 
“constructively consented” to suit by accepting federal funds while 
contemporaneously agreeing that it would “administer federal and state 
 265. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 266. Cf. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 502, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 12202) (“A State shall not be immune under the 
eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . .”). 
 267. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); see also Kimel 
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). 
 268. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79 (“Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress’ Article I commerce 
power, the private petitioners in today’s cases cannot maintain their suits against their state 
employers.”). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378–79 (2006) 
(permitting abrogation under the Bankruptcy Clause). 
 269. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976) (holding that Congress may abrogate 
state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its powers granted in Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 270. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 271. Id. at 672–74. 
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funds in compliance with federal law.”272  The Supreme Court overturned 
this ruling, holding that consent may only be shown “by the most express 
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] 
leave no room for any other reasonable construction.”273
I propose another approach, rooted in the Guarantee Clause’s text, 
history, and values.  When Congress abrogates sovereign immunity in clear 
terms, this should generally create a presumption that each state has 
consented to suit unless its legislature enacts a law saying that the state does 
not consent.
 
274
The word “republican,” James Madison explained, describes “a 
government which derives all its powers . . . from the great body of the 
people.”
   
275  It is not harmonious with this principle—and concomitantly, 
the Guarantee Clause—to presume that contrary to clear congressional 
legislation, the people nonetheless irrevocably ceded not just any power to 
the state, but their sovereignty:  the “supreme” power.276  As James Wilson 
explained during the Pennsylvania ratification debate, in a system of 
popular sovereignty, the supreme power “resides with the people.”277  And 
while the people could theoretically opt to cede this ultimate power, he 
discouraged such a move, opining that the people should not surrender 
sovereignty to “any government whatsoever.”278
Because the people are the ultimate sovereign, each citizen is vested with 
the ability to delegate power to two governments:  her state government and 
the Federal government.  In electing members of the House of 
Representatives, individuals have the opportunity to express their collective 
national will.
 
279  Further, in the original design of the Constitution, the 
people also had the power to elect state representatives who elected 
members of the Senate to represent the States.280
 
 272. Id. 
 
 273. Id. at 673 (citing Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)) 
(alteration in original); cf. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944) (“[W]hen 
we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial interference in the vital field of 
financial administration a clear declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal 
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found.”). 
 274. I say “generally,” because as later discussed, I argue that states should not be able to 
exempt themselves from damages statutes passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 275. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (cited in Amar, supra note 23, at 764). 
 276. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 1524 (defining sovereignty as “1.  
Supreme dominion, authority, or rule. . . .  2. The supreme political authority of an 
independent state. 3.  The state itself.”). 
 277. 2 ELLIOT DEBATES, supra note 84, at 456 (James Wilson). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 1, at 378–79 (James Madison) (describing 
the importance of a “branch of the federal government . . . dependent on the people alone” 
and that the House “should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy 
with, the people”) (emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 57,  supra note 1, at 141 
(James Madison) (describing the House as “a great proportion of the men deriving their 
advancement from their influence with the people,” which would oppose “innovations in the 
government subversive of the authority of the people”). 
 280. As James Madison explained in Federalist No. 62, the original design of the 
Constitution sought, through the Senate, “[to give] state governments such an agency in the 
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While the Seventeenth Amendment later provided citizens with the 
ability to elect senators directly, there is still little doubt that senators are 
expected to represent the interests of their respective states.281  We know 
this, in part, because the one provision in the entire Constitution that may 
not be amended, according to Article V, is the provision guaranteeing that 
“no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate.”282  James Madison explained at the Founding that under this 
system of equal suffrage, “each State is at once a constitutional recognition 
of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an 
instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.”283
When Congress votes to abrogate sovereign immunity in legislation 
signed by the President, it means that the people have collectively voted to 
do so through the House and, on behalf of their states, through the Senate.  
Madison put it this way:  “No law or resolution can now be passed without 
the concurrence first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of 
the states.”
 
284  Chief Justice Marshall later concurred, writing that “the 
states themselves[] are represented in congress.”285
2.  Popular Immunity from Congressional Abrogation 
  Thus, congressional 
abrogation is presumptive state consent.  The notion that a state must 
subsequently consent again is really, in practice, to say that a state attorney 
in a pre-trial motion may rescind the consent that the people collectively 
and through the states have already given.  And this is, in effect, placing the 
ultimate powers and immunities of sovereignty into the hands of one person 
at the expense of the people’s expressed will.  This is unsustainable in a 
Constitution that guarantees republican forms of government to the states 
and, therefore, to the people of those states. 
Even if one accepts that congressional abrogation should create a strong 
presumption in favor of state consent, questions remain.  Should this 
presumption ever be rebuttable?  If Congress authorized a class of lawsuits, 
that threatened a state’s integrity, what protection, if any, could that state 
seek?  How do we balance the fundamental principles animating the 
Guarantee Clause; that is, the desire to uphold popular sovereignty and the 
need to protect state integrity? 
 
formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 1, at 442 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
 281. See generally id. (describing the Senate, including the underlying premise for “the 
equality of representation” in the body). 
 282. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 283. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 1, at 443 (James Madison). 
 284. Id.; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS 175–83 (1980) (describing the protection of state interests in the constitutional 
design); Wechsler, supra note 259, at 548 (“[T]he Senate cannot fail to function as the 
guardian of state interests as such, when they are real enough to have political support or 
even to be instrumental in attaining other ends.”). See generally Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985). 
 285. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 435 (1819); see also John Marshall, Essays 
from the Alexandria Gazette:  John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 456, 495 (1969) (calling Senators “representatives of the state sovereignties”). 
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These questions are not new.  A doctrinal template exists; because 
litigants may file damages actions against constitutional wrongdoers acting 
under the color of state law,286 courts have long wrestled with how to 
balance vindicating rights with the need to ensure that government 
continues to function without undue impediment.  For example, in Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court confronted whether and how immunity 
should operate in damages actions against “high officials.”287  The Court 
framed its task as “an attempt to balance competing values:  . . . the 
importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens [and] ‘the 
need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the 
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official 
authority.’”288
In Harlow, the Court rejected the notion that all high officials should 
receive absolute immunity.  “[T]he greater power of [high] 
officials . . . affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct,” the 
Court reasoned.
 
289  Accordingly, “Damages actions against high officials 
[are] . . . ‘an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.’”290  
Indeed, damages actions are sometimes the only viable means through 
which a person may vindicate his or her rights.291
On the other hand, the Harlow Court acknowledged that officials are 
sometimes wrongly accused of unlawful conduct, and that the cost of 
disputing such claims is great, both for government officials and society.
 
292  
Further, a fear of lawsuits, the Court contended, could create a chilling 
effect, causing officials to perform their duties with less vigor.293
Balancing these concerns, the Court concluded that in suits against 
officials, something between absolute immunity and full exposure to 
lawsuits was required as a matter of policy.  These officials were entitled to 
“qualified immunity,” the Court concluded.
 
294  The Court then proceeded to 
plot out what qualified immunity should look like.  Rejecting a subjective 
test,295
 
 286. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 the Court embraced an objective test that continues to operate today:  
 287. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 288. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 406 (1978)).  While Harlow was a 
damages action against federal officials, not state officials, the Court has found that qualified 
immunity for these two groups operate identically. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 504 (concluding 
that it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits 
brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution 
against federal officials”). 
 289. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 506). 
 290. Id. (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 506). 
 291. Id. at 814. 
 292. Id. (“At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims 
frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant 
officials, but to society as a whole.”). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 815–16.  Prior to Harlow, the Supreme Court wrestled with whether to rely on 
defendant’s subjective intentions upon determining whether he or she was entitled to 
“qualified immunity.” See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1975) 
(embracing a disjunctive standard that assessed whether the defendant acted subjectively 
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a person may only maintain damages suits against officials who have 
transgressed clearly established federal rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known at the time of the violation.296
Harlow is instructive.  Qualified immunity jurisprudence accounts for the 
real challenges to our constitutional tradition of accountability that would 
occur if suits against government officials were never permitted.  Yet this 
jurisprudence also aims to account for the challenges to the constitutional 
tradition of government stability that would occur if all suits were permitted 
against government officials. 
 
Despite its usefulness as a template, providing states with a form of 
qualified immunity identical to government officials would suffer three 
problems.  First, there would be substantial overlap in the classes of cases in 
which litigants could proceed against state officials and cases in which they 
could proceed against states.  This overlap would render suits against states 
largely duplicative and superfluous.  Second, the policy risks present in 
lawsuits against states are different in kind from those present in lawsuits 
against state officials.  In suits against officials, there is the risk that fears of 
financial reprise will prevent discretionary officials from performing their 
tasks fully or vigorously.297  This risk would presumably decrease, 
however, if the state, not the discretionary official, faced financial liability 
for illegal conduct.  The Supreme Court has convincingly observed that the 
deterrence calculus operates differently in suits against employers as 
opposed to suits against employees.298
Third, I contend that there is a way to protect states from suit that is more 
responsive to the Guarantee Clause’s values of popular sovereignty and 
state integrity than the entirely judicially constructed doctrine that governs 
officials.  Specifically, I propose what I call “popular immunity.”  For a 
state to be exempt from a statute’s damages provisions, a democratically 
accountable body in a state must expressly object to specific congressional 
enactments that purport to abrogate sovereign immunity.  That is, if 
Congress passed a law that conferred rights on citizens and purported to 
bind states through civil actions, the presumption would be that states 
consented to suit unless a legislature or analogous body voted to exempt a 
state from classes of the authorized lawsuits.
 
299
 
maliciously or objectively unreasonably under existing law); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232, 247–48 (1974) (relying on whether defendant acted in good faith). 
  Just as a state legislature 
 296. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 297. Id. at 814 (“[T]here is the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties.’” (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))). 
 298. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court explained that 
while “overriding considerations of public policy . . . demanded that the official be given a 
measure of protection from personal liability,” those concerns were “less compelling, if not 
wholly inapplicable, when the liability of the municipal entity is at issue.” Id. at 653. 
 299. Two other alternatives, discussed in conversations with Professor Mark Gergen, 
would be to allow states to exempt themselves from specific executions of judgments (as 
opposed to classes of lawsuits), or require that state legislatures consent to specific 
executions.  The first would raise severe bill of attainder questions. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. 
art. I, § 16 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the 
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must approve before the state’s territorial boundaries may be altered,300
Under the current regime, in the battle between popularly enacted 
legislation and federalism, the latter almost always wins.
 
state legislatures would have the ability to protect their treasuries from 
some specific classes of congressionally authorized suits. 
301
Skeptics of this form of popular immunity might question whether 
allowing state legislatures to pass such exemptions would largely prove 
perfunctory because state legislatures across the country would routinely 
exempt their states from damages actions.  I offer two responses.  First, 
there are numerous examples of legislatures waiving sovereign immunity 
for the polities they represent.  At the federal level, Title VII waives 
sovereign immunity in certain discrimination suits against the federal 
government.
  By contrast, 
my approach absorbs dual values of federalism and democratic 
accountability, both of which are encompassed in the Guarantee Clause’s 
mission of protecting state integrity and popular sovereignty.  Different 
states would potentially reach different outcomes on questions such as 
whether to exempt their states from damages suits in specific contexts.  
Still, because democratically elected bodies would make decisions about 
these exemptions, final questions about sovereignty immunities would be 
answered by those who the Clause guarantees will remain the ultimate 
sovereign:  the people. 
302  Title III provides for suits against the United States for 
unlawful government surveillance.303  28 U.S.C. § 1491 provides a forum 
for suits against the federal government for constitutional violations and 
specified contractual violations, among other types of legal wrongs.304
 
obligation of contracts, shall be made.”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“No bill of attainder, ex 
post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and 
no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”).  And, permitting 
legislatures to overcome or evade final judgments would create equally vexing challenges 
under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (finding that Congress may not 
reopen final judgments without violating separation of powers principles).  Further, the 
second approach is inconsistent with my argument that Congressional authorization, by 
constitutional design, creates a presumption of state consent. 
  The 
 300. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 301. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) 
(striking down Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to states); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613–17, 619, 625–26 (2000) (nullifying the Violence 
Against Women Act to the extent that courts it permitted private remedies in federal lawsuits 
against perpetrators of gender-motivated violence); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 91 (2000) (striking down portions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as 
applied to states); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758–60 (1999) (striking down overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to states). 
 302. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b), (f) (2006); see also Steinhardt v. Potter, 326 F. Supp. 
2d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Section 1981a(a)(1) states that compensatory and punitive 
damages may be pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, a provision that governs suits against 
the United States.”). 
 303. 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (2006).  
 304. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have 
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon 
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated 
damages in cases not sounding in tort.”). 
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Federal Tort Claims Act permits suits against the federal government under 
“circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable 
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred.”305  And states across the country, through legislation, 
waive their sovereign immunity for classes of cases.306  Thus, it is hardly a 
foregone conclusion that state legislatures would routinely reject 
Congressional damages provisions in the same manner that state attorneys 
general routinely refuse to consent to suits.307
In fact, it would be surprising if legislatures rejected damages suits as 
frequently as government lawyers do, in light of James Madison’s 
observations about the benefits of “the genius of republican liberty.”
 
308  He 
contended that these benefits include “not only that all power should be 
derived from the people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept in 
independence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and, 
that, even during this short period, the trust should be placed not in a few, 
but in a number of hands.”309
Three additional caveats to my proposal deserve discussion.  The first is 
that “sovereignty” is, in my view, sui generis.  By this, I mean that while 
state legislatures could assert state sovereignty by exempting their states 
from damages suits, this does not mean that states would have the ability to 
exempt themselves from all other legislation.  In an attempt to protect state 
integrity, the Guarantee Clause codifies the relationship between popular 
sovereignty and state sovereignty in our federal system, with the latter 
inevitably gaining its legitimacy from the former.
  Placing decisions about sovereign immunity 
in the hands of state legislatures, rather than a handful of government 
lawyers, is harmonious with this observation. 
310  The Clause speaks, 
then, to when a state may legitimately wield the immunities of sovereignty, 
preventing practices that subvert representative government in a manner 
that threatens a state’s stability, existence, and parity with its sister states.  
Forcing a state to spend its funds in a given way, and making it possible to 
place state buildings and assets in the possession of a few, present peculiar 
types of risks to representative government and state integrity.311
 
 305. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
  While the 
 306. See, e.g., Georgia Tort Claims Act, GA. CODE ANN., § 50-21-23 (2011) (“The state 
waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and employees while acting 
within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such torts in 
the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances; 
provided, however, that the state’s sovereign immunity is waived subject to all exceptions 
and limitations set forth in this article.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5 (2011); Texas Tort 
Claims Act,  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (West 2009). 
 307. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 616, 618–22 
(2002) (discussing the role of state attorneys general in waiving state immunity).  If one 
conducts a simple legal search of cases against governments in the United States, one 
quickly sees that claiming sovereign immunity in pre-trial motions is very much the norm. 
 308. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 253 (James Madison). 
 309. Id.  
 310. See supra Part I.B. 
 311. An interesting question is whether states could invoke the Guarantee Clause to 
prevent a law that required states to spend state funds in a given way.  This question would 
almost always be rendered moot by the anti-commandeering requirement the Court has 
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Guarantee Clause protects against these peculiar threats, the Clause does 
not erase the Supremacy Clause from the Constitution.312
Second, my proposal would not disturb existing doctrine governing 
congressional decisions to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 
313  That is, state legislation could not 
overcome Congressional enactments passed pursuant to that provision.  In 
passing the Fourteenth Amendment, legislators consciously sought to 
expand the concept of “republican forms of governments” to include those 
formerly excluded.314  Further, as the Supreme Court explained in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, when Congress acts under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the 
terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one 
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own 
terms embody limitations on state authority.”315  As such, when Congress 
acts pursuant to Section 5, it acts with a special plenary power designed, in 
light of this nation’s past lessons, to protect free and equal representative 
government.  It would be inconsistent with the Guarantee Clause to permit 
states to circumvent this protection.316
 
found in the Tenth Amendment. See e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(declining to consider whether anti-commandeering principles animate the Guarantee 
Clause, because the Tenth Amendment serves that purpose); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992).  The anti-commandeering principle, then, already provides states with an 
administrable and sufficient remedy when Congress attempts to force states to behave in a 
given way.  In any event, permitting states to exempt themselves from anti-commandeering 
legislation would prove difficult to administer.  The question whether a statute expressly 
abrogates sovereign immunity is rarely a difficult one.  The question whether a law 
“commandeers” a state occupies a far more contestable space. 
 
 312. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 313. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 314. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (“[N]o 
government can be accepted as ‘a republican form of government’ where a large proportion 
of native-born citizens, charged with no crime and no failure of duty, is left wholly 
unrepresented, although compelled to pay taxes; and especially where a particular race is 
singled out and denied all representation.”). 
 315. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 316. Indeed, the conclusion in Bitzer that Congress should be permitted to abrogate 
sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 was unanimous, and was written by an ardent 
proponent of federalism, Justice William Rehnquist. See id.  In the following decades, both 
the liberal and conservative wings of the Court have continued to agree that Congress may 
abrogate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 356 (2001) (concluding that abrogation pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment had not properly occurred, not that such abrogation was 
impermissible); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (recognizing this 
power, while concluding that an act did not fall within the scope of this congressional 
authorization). 
  The question remains open whether Congress should be able to abrogate sovereign 
immunity, in an unqualified manner, when it acts under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment or Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.  In Bitzer, Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned:  “There can be no doubt that [precedent] has sanctioned intrusions by Congress, 
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Third, as is the current state of the law, congressional abrogation would, 
under my proposal, require a clear statement of Congress’s specific intent to 
abrogate immunity.317  Not only would this assure courts that Congress has 
confronted and deliberated about the consequences of abrogation,318 any 
other approach would make it difficult for a state to know when it should 
take steps to exempt itself from damages actions.  Likewise, state 
legislatures who sought to exempt their states from suit should be required 
to do so in clear terms, both so that voters may react to the decision and so 
that courts can apply the doctrine in a principled and administrable 
manner.319
B.  Constitutional Violations with a Substantial Nexus 
to Representative Government 
 
The second proposal permits persons to sue their own states for 
constitutional violations that bear a substantial nexus to free and equal 
representative government.  In a system of popular sovereignty, a state’s 
claim of sovereignty can only be legitimate if the people vested the state 
with the right to make this claim.  As John Trenchard explained in Number 
60 of Cato’s Letters, his influential eighteenth century defense of 
republican principles, “Government . . . can have no Power, but such as 
Men can give, and such as they actually did give, or permit for their own 
Sakes,” explaining that “no Man, or Council of Men . . . can claim to 
themselves and their Families any Superiority, or natural Sovereignty over 
their Fellow-Creatures naturally as good as them.”320  It follows that if the 
channels through which power flows from the governed to the government 
become corrupted or clogged, there should be a means to correct that.321
 
acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres 
of autonomy previously reserved to the States.” 427 U.S. at 455.  The answer to this question 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 
  Suffice it to say that the strongest textual support for unqualified congressional 
abrogation appears in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Sections 1–4 are all express limitations 
on state power.  By contrast, the Thirteenth Amendment never mentions the word “state” 
(except when referring broadly to “The United States”).  And the Fifteenth Amendment 
applies to state and federal governments alike.  For the most part, however, it is difficult to 
conceive of an example of congressional abrogation under Section 2 of the Thirteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendments that was not also justifiable under Section 5 of the Fourteenth. 
 317. See Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & 
Welfare, 411 U.S 279, 281 (1973).  
 318. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“In traditionally sensitive 
areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement 
assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical 
matters involved in the judicial decision.”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989) (providing a similar reasoning). 
 319. ELY, supra note 25, at 125 (calling Gerald Gunther’s goal of “flushing out legislative 
purposes so that the voters can better react to them, . . . entirely laudable and . . . an 
appropriately constitutional concern”). 
 320. John Trenchard, NO. 60 CATO’S LETTERS (cited in John Jezierski, Parliament or 
People:  James Wilson and Blackstone on the Nature and Location of Sovereignty, 32 J. HIS. 
IDEAS 95 (1971)). 
 321. See generally ELY, supra note 25, at 105–34 (chapter entitled “Clearing the 
Channels of Political Change”). 
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Under this proposal, if a state enacted a Poll Tax in contravention of the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, as at least one state was found to have done as 
recently as 2005,322
To place this proposal in context, it is important to recall that for the bulk 
of this nation’s history, direct and indirect barriers to the franchise thwarted 
popular sovereignty for entire swaths of the country.  For example, in 
antebellum America, blacks were a majority of the population in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina
 victims would have a damages remedy compensating 
them for the illegal tax.  Other constitutional provisions that would almost 
certainly bear a substantial nexus with free and equal participation in 
representative government are the Thirteenth Amendment, Fifteenth 
Amendment, Nineteenth Amendment, Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
323 and approached majorities in others.324  
Nonetheless, as slaves, blacks had “no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect.”325
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Senator Charles Sumner advocated for 
the post-war amendments and civil rights legislation by explaining that “no 
government can be accepted as ‘a republican form of government’ where a 
large proportion of native-born citizens, charged with no crime and no 
failure of duty, is left wholly unrepresented, although compelled to pay 
taxes; and especially where a particular race is singled out and denied all 
representation.”
 
326  The Reconstruction Amendments sought to correct this 
deeply engrained and pervasive debacle masquerading as democracy.327
 
 322. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(enjoining a $20.00 fee required to obtain documentation to vote).  As an aside, Georgia was 
not one of the states that voted to ratify that amendment. 22 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 163 
(1964). 
  
Most notably, the Fourteenth Amendment bestowed citizenship on all 
persons born in the United States, and provided for basic rights and equality 
 323. Christopher R. Adamson, Punishment After Slavery:  Southern State Penal Systems, 
1865–1890, 30 SOCIAL PROBS. 555, 558 (1983). 
 324. MARK CARLETON, POLITICS AND PUNISHMENT:  THE HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA 
STATE PENAL SYSTEM 44 (1971). 
 325. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (describing blacks’ rights, or lack of 
rights, at the Founding). 
 326. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner).  Amar 
calls the problem of who constitutes “the people” in American republicanism “the 
denominator problem.” See Amar, supra note 23. 
 327. See generally Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument:  
Federalism, Reconstruction and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1992 (2003); cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).  Daniel Korobkin has noted that 
Senator Sumner, and a number of others in the Senate and House, expressly invoked the 
Guarantee Clause.  Sumner contended that the Clause guarded against “Oligarchy, 
Aristocracy, Caste, and Monopoly, founded on color, with the tyranny of taxation without 
representation . . . .” Korobkin, supra note 72, at 498 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS. 14 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner)).  Sumner further defined republican 
government as a “government founded on the people and the consent of the governed.” Id.  
Similarly, Senator John B. Henderson contended that “the true republican principle that ‘all 
men are created equal,’ and that when government is to be established, its just powers must 
come from ‘the consent of the governed.’” Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 
120).  Representative Sidney Perham, Senator William M. Stewart, and Senator James W. 
Nye also invoked the clause. Id. 
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throughout the states.328  That amendment has been central to “clearing the 
channels of political change,”329 including by, for example, securing the 
right to vote330 and “[f]acilitating the [r]epresentation of [m]inorities”331 
(and in some states majorities)332 through the Equal Protection Clause.333  
To maintain republican forms of government, history teaches that these 
amendments should be more fully enforceable.334
A review of the rationales supporting sovereign immunity, lined up 
against the text and purposes behind the Guarantee Clause, further 
encourages permitting lawsuits against states under constitutional 
provisions with a substantial nexus to free and equal participation in 
representative government.  First, it is unlikely that constitutional claims 
limited to provisions aimed at equal participation in representative 
government would result in breaking the back of a state’s treasury.
 
335  
Indeed, if such claims yielded that result, this would raise questions about 
whether the state had a “republican form of government” at all; it would 
mean that the state engaged in commensurate massive deprivations of the 
constitutional rights embodying representative government.336  Second, 
such suits would not be in tension with “the principle of representative 
government”337
Some readers may nonetheless have remaining concerns about the costs 
of allowing lawsuits under the Fourteenth Amendment.
 because they would remedy the failure to provide 
representative government. 
338
 
 328. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
  It is worth 
 329. See ELY, supra note 25, at 118–19 n* (describing the Fourteenth Amendment’s role 
in expanding the franchise in a chapter entitled “Clearing the Channels of Political 
Change”); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that “a 
State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes 
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard”). 
 330. ELY, supra note 25, at 118–19 n*. 
 331. Id. at 135. 
 332. See CARLETON, supra note 324, at 44. 
 333. See Ely, supra note 25, at 118–19 n*. 
 334. See generally supra Part II.C. 
 335. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999). 
 336. W.E.B. Du Bois explored this theme in his 1935 book on Reconstruction, noting that 
even after Reconstruction, blacks were disenfranchised in a manner foreign to generally 
recognized conceptions of popular sovereignty.  “In no other civilized and modern land has 
so great a group of people . . . been allowed so small a voice in their own government.” 
W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 694 (First Free Press ed. 1998) 
(1935); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. 
COMMENT. 296 n.3 (2000) (citing DU BOIS, supra at 694).  Indeed, the Reconstruction 
Amendments proved important in expanding the franchise one hundred years after their 
passage, providing the constitutional foundation for the Voting Rights Act.  Prior to that act, 
very few blacks in the South were registered to vote due to decades of intimidation and legal 
barriers.  For example, the black voter registration level was 6.7 percent in Mississippi. 
Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1995). 
 337. Alden, 527 U.S. at 751 (providing this rational for sovereign immunity). 
 338. My discussions with Richard H. Fallon raised a difficult question that implicates 
how to calculate the probable cost of damages suits against states:  under what circumstances 
should a citizen be permitted to sue a state under the Takings Clause?  Such claims do not 
have an obvious link with free and equal representative government.  Though, it is worth 
noting, some scholars have certainly identified a link between private property and 
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observing, however, that permitting lawsuits against states would not 
necessarily require respondeat superior liability, in which a state would 
routinely shoulder liability for the act of its agents.  In the context of 
municipal liability, respondeat superior has consistently, albeit if sometimes 
narrowly, been rejected by the Supreme Court.  The Court has expressed 
concerns about the costs to representative government in adopting 
respondeat superior liability with respect to suits against municipalities.  
The Court has instead held that a municipality is liable for its own 
unconstitutional policies or for its deliberate indifference to unconstitutional 
acts.339  Similarly, cities may not be held liable for punitive damages.340  
The Court reasoned in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. that “[n]either 
reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the 
shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.”341
But even with those limitations, suits against states have a role to play in 
ensuring free and equal representative government.  Today, even when a 
state’s policies or laws violate federal law, damages suits against state 
actors are often unavailable due to qualified immunity.  Likewise, 
injunctive or declaratory relief is often unavailable due to City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons.
  This limitation could 
also be used to limit the threat to representative government in the context 
of suits against states. 
342  Under these circumstances, damages actions against 
the state would sometimes be the only means to have constitutional 
violations acknowledged by courts, let alone corrected.343
IV.  TOWARD A LESS “EMBARRASSING” DOCTRINE 
  Without such a 
remedy for constitutional violations that bear a substantial nexus with free 
and equal representative government, there is risk that the ultimate power 
will reside with a fraction of the population, not with “the people.” 
Enlisting the Guarantee Clause to sustain sovereign immunity, in 
contexts other than those enumerated in the Eleventh Amendment, would 
likely mitigate some of the academic criticisms that sovereign immunity is 
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution.344
 
representative government. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, History Lean:  The Reconciliation of 
Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 592 (1995).  
Whether there is a sufficient doctrinal basis to justify damages suits against states for takings 
violations is beyond the scope of this Article, but is certainly a topic deserving of more 
theoretical work. See, e.g., Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign 
Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 494 (2006). 
  The approach to sovereign 
immunity outlined in Part III could save the doctrine from itself. 
 339. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 340. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981). 
 341. Id. at 267. 
 342. See supra note 149. 
 343. See supra note 220. 
 344. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1463 (referring to the sovereign immunity doctrine 
as “The Embarrassing Eleventh Amendment”). 
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A. The Text 
The textual gap between sovereign immunity doctrine and scholarly 
debates could potentially narrow if the Guarantee Clause’s language, 
history, and principles played a prominent analytic role in shaping the 
doctrine.  Rather than deploy “freestanding federalism” to expand the 
Eleventh Amendment to reach classes of cases its language simply cannot 
support,345 the Court would instead confront the actual words of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The plain meaning and diversity explanations, 
described in Part II, would likely serve as starting points in this 
discussion,346 as would more recent scholarly contributions.347 
The Guarantee Clause provides better textual support than the Eleventh 
Amendment for the Court’s conclusion in Alden v. Maine
1.  State Courts 
348 that Congress 
could not abrogate sovereign immunity in state courts pursuant to its Article 
I powers.349  As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has argued, the Constitution 
“says absolutely nothing about whether states should have immunity in 
state court.”350  Indeed, consistent with this observation, the Eleventh 
Amendment’s language extends only to the “Judicial Power of the United 
States.”351  By contrast, the Guarantee Clause’s text broadly governs what 
“The United States shall guarantee,” without reference to the obligations of 
any specific branch of government.352  Thus, the Guarantee Clause more 
readily lends itself to capturing Congress’s obligation to protect, and 
concomitantly not destroy, state integrity and representative government 
than the Eleventh Amendment—regardless of forum.353
2.  Text and Principle 
 
The Guarantee Clause also bears a more textually sound connection to 
some of the reasons the court has given for why private suits against states 
are impermissible.  The Court has reasoned that such suits clash with “
 
 345. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009). 
the 
 346. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (adopting the 
diversity explanation); see also Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce:  A Peace Proposal for the 
Supreme Court’s Costly War over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 
2511 (2006) (“[T]his text appears to extinguish federal jurisdiction over all suits against 
states by citizens of another state, while leaving intact jurisdiction over suits arising under 
the Constitution or federal laws where the parties are not so aligned—most notably, suits by 
citizens against their own states.”). 
 347. See generally Clark, supra note 29. 
 348. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 349. Id. at 732–33. 
 350. Chemerinsky, supra note 31, at 1206. 
 351. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 352. Id. art. IV, § 4. 
 353. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1209 (2010) (urging closer attention to the express grammatical subjects in constitutional 
clauses). 
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principle of representative government.”354  Among other things, such suits 
may deplete a state’s “treasury or perhaps even [endanger] government 
buildings or property which the State administers on the public’s behalf.”355
3.  State Waiver 
  
The text within and surrounding the Guarantee Clause reflects the drafters’ 
concerns about representative government and its importance to states’ 
stability, existence and relative parity.  By contrast, it is, to say the least, not 
facially apparent that the Eleventh Amendment commands courts to 
consider concerns about representative government and state integrity. 
Allowing the Guarantee Clause to inform sovereign immunity would also 
help clarify an apparent enigma in the Court’s current jurisprudence.  The 
jurisprudence facially allows states to waive subject matter jurisdiction in 
federal courts, an axiomatic violation of the basic principle that federal 
courts have limited and precisely enumerated jurisdiction.  This problem 
emerges because the Supreme Court has sometimes broadly referred to 
sovereign immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.356  The 
Court has also consistently held, in other contexts, that subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived.357  Nonetheless, the Court permits states to 
consent to lawsuits against them,358 or otherwise waive sovereign 
immunity.359
The approach to sovereign immunity advanced in this Article makes 
textual sense of this apparent paradox.  The Eleventh Amendment is a 
jurisdictional provision, in that it circumscribes the “Judicial Power of the 
 
 
 354. Alden, 527 U.S. at 751. 
 355. Id. at 749. 
 356. See Katherine Florey, Insufficiently Jurisdictional:  The Case Against Treating State 
Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1417–31 (2004). 
 357. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[S]ubject-matter 
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or 
waived.”). 
 358. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) (“Undoubtedly a State may be sued by 
its own consent . . . .”). 
 359. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (stating, in limiting the 
circumstances under which a state may be deemed to have waived its immunity, that 
“[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of 
constitutional rights”); Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity:  
State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 288 
(2002) (noting that the Supreme Court “repeatedly has confirmed that sovereign immunity 
from suit in federal court is a privilege that the state may waive at its pleasure”).  If one 
cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity is jurisdiction, how does 
one waive sovereign immunity?  Scott Dodson and Katherine Florey are among the most 
recent scholars to have engaged this apparent paradox. See Scott Dodson, Hybridizing 
Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1473 (2011) (concluding that the word “jurisdiction” is 
often used in a manner that lacks sufficient nuance, as it can and should reflect different 
concepts and rules under different circumstances); Florey, supra note 356 (concluding that 
state sovereign immunity is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction under Article III).  
Another approach that has been proposed that could address the paradox is to treat sovereign 
immunity as a matter of personal jurisdiction. See generally Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002). 
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United States.”360  At a minimum, it would defy the plain language of that 
amendment for a federal court to hear a suit based on state law initiated by a 
citizen of one state against another state.361  This is true regardless of 
whether a state “waived” the Eleventh Amendment or not.  The language of 
the Eleventh Amendment parallels that of Article III so closely and so 
deliberately that to conclude that a state could “waive it” arguably makes no 
more sense than the notion that a state could “waive” federal question 
jurisdiction.362
My approach provides a principled textual basis to distinguish the 
jurisdictional constraint of the Eleventh Amendment from the sovereignty-
based constraint of the Guarantee Clause.  Cases in which citizens sue their 
own states under federal law are not captured within the jurisdictional ambit 
of the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, these cases fall more readily within 
the more accommodating language of the Guarantee Clause, and the 
affirmative duty that it creates for the federal government to protect states.  
A state’s decision to subject itself to suit does not represent an apparent 
textual derogation of this federal duty. 
 
B.  The Political Question 
Enlisting the Guarantee Clause in discussions of sovereign immunity 
serves an additional function:  it would ameliorate the criticism that the 
clause has been rendered superfluous.363  The Supreme Court has held that 
challenges to state or congressional action under the Guarantee Clause 
present non-justiciable political questions.364  My proposal is not ensnared 
within this proscription, however, because unlike previous attempts to 
awaken the Clause, I do not contend that the Guarantee Clause creates an 
independent cause of action.365
This proposal, therefore, does not run up against any of the traditional 
reasons for concluding that a provision presents a non-justiciable political 
question.  The text of the Guarantee Clause does not, for example, vest all 
  Rather, I simply argue that the Clause 
should inform, and transform, the extant affirmative defense of sovereign 
immunity. 
 
 360. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 361. This is true under either the plain meaning or diversity approach to understanding 
the Eleventh Amendment. 
 362. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1087–1131 (describing the advantages of viewing 
sovereign immunity as an issue of federal power rather than judicial power). 
 363. See supra note 35. 
 364. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 225 (1962). 
 365. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 887, 944–45 (1994); see also Richard L. Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of 
“Republicanism” Unfilled:  An Argument for the Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee 
Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 75, 82 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007). (explaining 
why the clause should not create an independent cause of action, even if there are judicially 
manageable enforcement standards). 
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germane discretion in a branch of government other than courts.366  To the 
contrary, the Clause issues a command more broadly to “The United 
States.”367  Nor does my proposal create a risk of a national security 
“embarrassment” abroad or at home.368  Finally, and importantly, my 
proposal does not “ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for 
which judicially manageable standards are lacking.”369  The Court has 
regularly defined the scope of immunities—including sovereign 
immunity,370 qualified immunity,371 and certain forms of absolute 
immunity for judges,372 witnesses,373 prosecutors374 and legislators.375  If 
courts accepted this Article’s invitation, it would therefore simply require 
taking the Clause more seriously when performing a task that they have 
regularly engaged in for hundreds of years.376
CONCLUSION 
 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine has undergone many substantial surgeries.  
And despite the term “Eleventh Amendment immunity,”377 the Court has 
rarely been troubled by the text of any specific provision when assessing 
suits against one’s state rooted in federal question jurisdiction.  What is 
unclear is how much longer a doctrine so rootless can survive.  The number 
of times the Court has reversed itself on basic aspects of sovereign 
immunity doctrine probably does not help its life expectancy should 
members of a future court have different views about the value of 
federalism for its own sake.378
 
 366. Hasen, supra note 
  As Professor Andrew Coan has noted, 
“dating back to [1985] . . . the court has split 5–4, or more narrowly, along 
365, at 82; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 
(1993) (concluding that whether the Senate properly tried an impeachment was a political 
question, in part because Article I, § 3 vested the power to try impeachments in the Senate).  
 367. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
 368. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226; see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (ability to 
terminate treaties is a political question). 
 369. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226. 
 370. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 371. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 
194 (2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
 372. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978). 
 373. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983). 
 374. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–79 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409 (1976). 
 375. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402–03 (1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
U.S. 367, 379 (1951). 
 376. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1986) (identifying the long standing 
nature of certain immunities). 
 377. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000). 
 378. Coan, supra note 346, at 2526. 
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political lines”379
In addition, the key principles generally associated with stare decisis in 
the constitutional context, famously outlined in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
 on questions about the sovereign immunity’s scope and 
existence. 
380 do not save the doctrine.  The 
Court’s creation of complex tests renders sovereign immunity difficult to 
administer.381  Reversing sovereign immunity does not readily evoke 
concerns about reliance interests because theoretically, states do not have an 
interest in maintaining unconstitutional or unlawful conduct.382  But above 
all this, it is generally accepted by commentators and even sitting judges 
that current textual and historical narratives supporting current sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence are in serious doubt.383
A reanimated Guarantee Clause may both rescue and reform state 
sovereign immunity.  On one hand, the text and history of the Clause 
support the view that it was meant to protect popular sovereignty through 
representative government, thereby guarding against certain adversaries of 
states’ ability to survive and govern.  These are among the same aims that 
fuel sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  On the other hand, as the 
constitutional embodiment of popular sovereignty, the Clause also 
necessarily suggests certain limitations on state sovereignty.  The Guarantee 
Clause enforces a constitutional principle that sometimes gets blurred or 
battered in the back-and-forth about state sovereignty:  all sovereignty, all 
power, in the American system emanates from the people.  That is an 
unfulfilled guarantee. 
 
 
 
 379. Id.; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (concluding, through four justices, that the Eleventh Amendment’s reach 
extended no further than its text). 
 380. 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). 
 381. Id.; see also Coan, supra note 346, at 2520 (noting that the doctrine is “difficult for 
lower courts to administer”). See generally Karlan, supra note 166 at 1913–14 (“The United 
States Supreme Court has pieced together a crazy quilt of constitutional doctrines that 
undercut its central goal of intelligently and efficiently refining broad constitutional 
commands.”). 
 382. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992); see also Monell 
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700 (noting that governments do not have a 
reliance interest in violating the constitution; “[t]his is not an area of commercial law in 
which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs in reliance on the expected 
stability of decision” (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221–22 (1961))). 
 383. See supra note 35. 
